2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.ic.2018.02.024
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Extending finite-memory determinacy to multi-player games

Abstract: We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding class of multi-player multi-outcome games. This generalizes a previous result by Brihaye, De Pril and Schewe. We provide a number of example that separate the various criteria we explore. Our proofs are generally constructive, that is, provide upper bounds for the memory requ… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Proving finite-memory determinacy is sometimes difficult (already in deterministic games, e.g., [BHM + 17]), and as opposed to memoryless strategies, there are few widely applicable results. We mention [LPR18], which provides sufficient conditions for finite-memory determinacy in Boolean combinations of finite-memory-determined objectives in deterministic games. Results for multi-player non-zero-sum games are also available [LP18].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Proving finite-memory determinacy is sometimes difficult (already in deterministic games, e.g., [BHM + 17]), and as opposed to memoryless strategies, there are few widely applicable results. We mention [LPR18], which provides sufficient conditions for finite-memory determinacy in Boolean combinations of finite-memory-determined objectives in deterministic games. Results for multi-player non-zero-sum games are also available [LP18].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kahneman and others criticized [20] the theory of expected utility and developed alternatives [7]. Moreover, impossibility results were proven [19]. Nevertheless, it still remains the standard theory in game theory [14] and the most common tool in economic reasoning [9].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%