Formalization of Receipt-Freeness in the Context of Electronic Voting

Bräunlich, Katharina; Grimm, Rüdiger

doi:10.1109/ares.2011.25

Cited by 5 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Similarly, the symbolic definition of receipt-freeness in [26] also requires the voter to adopt a strategy to fool the adversary. Other definitions in symbolic models aim at characterizing the notion of a receipt [14,33,36] but (as usual in symbolic models) they are much more abstract than standard computational models.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

BeleniosRF

Chaidos

Cortier

Fuchsbauer

et al. 2016

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We provide a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for voting protocols with non-interactive ballot casting, which we name strong receipt-freeness (sRF). To our knowledge, sRF is the first game-based definition of receipt-freeness in the literature, and it has the merit of being particularly concise and simple. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF inherits its simplicity and does not require any anti-coercion strategy from the voters. We implement BeleniosRF and show its feasibility on a number of platforms, including desktop computers and smartphones. 1 After successful authentication between the voter and the ballot box, ballot casting is non-interactive.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

BeleniosRF

Chaidos

Cortier

Fuchsbauer

et al. 2016

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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show abstract

“…To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a formal model that satisfies all of the criteria above (Table 1). As mentioned above, the formal model in this paper is based on Grimm, Hupf and Volkamer (2010), Bräunlich and Grimm (2011) and and covers all of the security objectives of Fairness (One Voter, One Vote), Eligibility, Receipt-Freeness, Verifiability and protection against errors by haste. By choosing a stateoriented formalism, the formal model in this paper is suitable for the evaluation and certification of electronic voting products against the CC according to EAL5 or higher.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The formalization in this paper requires some formal basics which are described in this section. This section is mainly a summary of the corresponding parts in Grimm, Hupf, and Volkamer (2010), Bräunlich and Grimm (2011) and .…”

Section: Formal Basicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Development of A Formal Security Model for Electronic Voting Systems

Bräunlich

Grimm

2013

International Journal of Information Security and Privacy

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Trust that an electronic voting system realizes the security requirements in an adequate manner is an essential premise for electronic elections. Trust in a system can be achieved by controlling the system security. There are two ways to assure system security. One way is the evaluation and certification of the implementation’s security by neutral experts. Another way is the verification of the outcome by the users. Both approaches, verification and certification, should be combined to reasonably justify the voter’s trust in the electronic voting system. In this paper a formal security model with respect to the requirements of Fairness, Eligibility, Secrecy and Receipt-Freeness, Verifiability and Protection against Precipitation is given. This formal model helps to clarify and truly understand these requirements. Furthermore, it can be used for the evaluation and certification of online voting products according to the Common Criteria.

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“…Verification using process algebras culminated in the successful automatic verification of protocols by Backes, Hriţcu and Maffei [BHM08]. Secondly, there are works formalising privacy in logics, including work by Jonker and De Vink [JdV06] and Bräunlich and Grimm [BG11] in first-order logic, and privacy in epistemic logic by Jonker and Pieters [JP06] and later Baskar, Ramanujam and Suresh [BRS07]. In addition to privacy and verifiability claims, there are a plethora of other security requirements for voting systems.…”

Section: Verifiabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Privacy and verifiability in voting systems: Methods, developments and trends

Jonker¹,

Mauw²,

Pang³

2013

Computer Science Review

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One of the most challenging aspects in computer-supported voting is to combine the apparently conflicting requirements of privacy and verifiability. On the one hand, privacy requires that a vote cannot be traced back from the result to a voter, while on the other hand, verifiability states that a voter can trace the effect of her vote on the result. This can be addressed using various privacy-enabling cryptographic primitives which also offer verifiability.As more and more refined voting systems were proposed, understanding of first privacy and later verifiability in voting increased, and notions of privacy as well as notions of verifiability in voting became increasingly more refined. This has culminated in a variety of verifiable systems that use cryptographic primitives to ensure specific kinds of privacy. However, the corresponding privacy and verifiability claims are not often verified independently. When they are investigated, claims have been invalidated sufficiently often to warrant a cautious approach to them.The multitude of notions, primitives and proposed solutions that claim to achieve both privacy and verifiability form an interesting but complex landscape. The purpose of this paper is to survey this landscape by providing an overview of the methods, developments and current trends regarding privacy and verifiability in voting systems.

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Formalization of Receipt-Freeness in the Context of Electronic Voting

Cited by 5 publications

References 15 publications

BeleniosRF

BeleniosRF

Development of A Formal Security Model for Electronic Voting Systems

Privacy and verifiability in voting systems: Methods, developments and trends

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