Formalisation of charcoal value chains and livelihood outcomes in Central- and West Africa

Abstract

Formalisation of charcoal value chains and livelihood outcomes in Central-and West Africa Schure, J.; Ingram, V.J.; Sakho-Jimbira, M.S.; Levang, P.; Wiersum, K.F. General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. This paper examines the link between formalisation of charcoal institutions and livelihood outcomes in Centraland West Africa. The woodfuel trade generally commenced informally, little controlled by legal or bureaucratic means. Developing formal institutions is often considered as a way of managing charcoal production more sustainably. However, formalisation can have adverse effects for charcoal producers and traders when this hinders their capacity to access the resource or markets. In order to assess the relations between the formalisation of charcoal institutions and socio-economic outcomes for those involved, this study combines a value chain and livelihoods perspective. A review of case studies and empirical data show that (1) West African countries, with a longer history of dealing with woodfuel issues, have more formal mechanisms in place to deal with charcoal management and these are more embedded into cross-sectorial energy and environmental policies; (2) Despite regulatory mechanisms dealing with woodfuel in all countries, institutions are mainly embedded in informal institutions and based upon customary rules, which allows large numbers of actors to be involved, but also leads to substantial unsustainable and unofficial production, corrupt practises and loss of tax revenues; (3) Formal mechanisms can have negative consequences, such as: conflicts of interests over tax revenues, difficulties in avoiding 'free riders' from sustainable management initiatives, and disproportional benefits reaped by more powerful urban-based actors. Comparing the West African countries with Central African countries where attention is relatively new, indicates that conditions for successful charcoal institutions are: devolving power and responsibilities for woodfuel management to a local level, monitoring woodfuel trade, (tax) incentives for sustainably produced charcoal and reinvesting taxes in social and environmental aims.

The Marginalization of Sustainable Charcoal Production in the Policies of a Modernizing African Nation

“…This assumption is supported by evidence from Niger and Senegal, where the adoption of formalized, community-based woodfuel production has resulted in an increase in the forest stock (de Miranda et al, 2010). In contrast, in Tanzania and in many of the other top charcoal-producing countries in Africa, charcoal value chains are largely informal with production proceeding in the absence of sustainable harvesting plans Schure et al, 2013). The informality of production, particularly the absence of formalized and sustainable harvesting, has contributed to widespread forest degradation and, to a lesser extent, deforestation, particularly in the vicinity of concentrated markets, such as large urban areas (Chidumayo and Gumbo, 2013).…”

“…If these assumptions are correct, then we can infer that embedding sustainable charcoal production in national policy will help to safeguard forests, and the ecosystem services that they provide. However, we also recognize that formalization does not guarantee sustainability (Schure et al, 2013), and that there are examples of government attempts to control supply which have, instead, disrupted supply (Ribot, 1999), and of informal production in which forest ecosystem services are sustained (Ribot, 1999;Woollen et al, 2016). We also recognize that there are currently few examples of formalized, sustainable charcoal production in practice (de Miranda et al, 2010;Zulu and Richardson, 2013).…”

Leakage effects in natural resource supply chains: a case study from the Peruvian commercial charcoal market

“…This sentiment can be extended to the charcoal industry where research has often focused on rural and domestic production and use (Coomes & Burt 2001;Cooke et al 2008;Labarta et al 2008;Medeiros et al 2012;Mekuria et al 2012), and little attention has been paid to the largerscale commercial supply chains. More recently, this gap in our knowledge has begun to be addressed by some very compelling case studies and policy papers based in Africa and Asia (Zulu 2010;Msuya et al 2011;Agyeman et al 2012;Schure et al 2013). The case study presented here contributes to this literature by describing a contrast between frugal rural domestic use and a booming urban commercial charcoal market in Peru's capital of Lima.…”

Conceptual Analysis: The Charcoal-Agriculture Nexus to Understand the Socio-Ecological Contexts Underlying Varied Sustainability Outcomes in African Landscapes

“…In contrast, and more commonly, complex markets involving many stakeholders and sectors tend to result in inequitable distribution (Sepp, 2008). Frequently, incoherent legislation from different government departments, such as energy, agriculture, environment, natural resource management and local government, which target the same or different sections of the value chain, results in an unclear framework for stakeholders (Sepp, 2008;Schure et al, 2013;Iiyama et al, 2014a). Transport enforcement officers often take advantage of such unclear frameworks by demanding bribes to ignore unsustainable practices (Kambewa et al, 2007;Schure et al, 2013).…”