Formal verification of safety protocol in train control system

Zhang, Yan; Tang, Tao; Li, Keping; Mera, J. M.; Zhu, Li; Zhao, Lin; Xu, Tianhua

doi:10.1007/s11431-011-4562-2

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(46 reference statements)

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“…In [29], the authors produce a formal description of safety communication protocols in train control systems TCS using interface automata and UML sequence diagrams. Deadlocks, live-locks, and some mandatory consistency properties of the proposed case study were checked by SPIN [16].…”

Section: Discussion and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Object-Oriented Component-Based Design using Behavioral Contracts

Mouelhi¹,

Agrou²,

Chouali

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the 18th International ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on Component-Based Software Engineering

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In this paper, we propose a formal approach for the design of object-oriented component-based systems using behavioral contracts. This formalism merges interface automata describing communication protocols of components with the semantics of their operations. On grounds of consistency with the object-oriented paradigms, we revisit the notions of incremental design and independent implementability of interface automata by novel definitions of components compatibility, composition, and refinement. Our work is illustrated by a design case study of CBTC railway systems.

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Section: Discussion and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Object-Oriented Component-Based Design using Behavioral Contracts

Mouelhi¹,

Agrou²,

Chouali

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the 18th International ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on Component-Based Software Engineering

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“…Related Work: Some past work has also looked at the EuroRadio protocol: Esposito et al [10] and Franekova et al [11] use UML, Zhang et al [18] use the SPIN model checker and Hongjie et al in [14] use Petrinets. However, all of these analyses only look at single runs of the protocol, they do not consider an active attacker, and they do not try to test the security properties we focus on in this paper, rather they look at general correctness issues such as deadlock detection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Formal Security Analysis of ERTMS Train to Trackside Protocols

Ruiter

Thomas

Chothia

2016

Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification

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Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document. When citing, please reference the published version. Take down policy While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.

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“…The formal model was structured to retain the reusability and scalability properties of the system being studied. Zhang et al 14 proposed a formal verification method to describe the safety communication protocols using interface automata (IA). They translated IA model into PROMELA model so that the protocols could be verified by the model checker SPIN.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on formal modeling and verification of safety computer platform

Wang

Tang

2016

Advances in Mechanical Engineering

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With the development of automatic control and communication technology, communication-based train control system is adopted by more and more urban mass transit system to automatically supervise the train speed to follow a desired trajectory. Taking reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety into consideration, 2 3 2-out-of-2 safety computer platform is usually utilized as the hardware platform of safety-critical subsystem in communication-based train control. To enhance the safety integrity level of safety computer platform, safety-related logics have to be verified before integrating them into practical systems. Therefore, a significant problem of developing safety computer platform is how to guarantee that system behaviors will satisfy the function requirements as well as responding to external events and processes within the limit of right time. Based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of function and timing characteristics, this article introduces a formal modeling and verification approach for this real-time system. In the proposed method, timed automata network model for 2 3 2-out-of-2 safety computer platform is built, and system requirements are specified and formalized as computation tree logic properties which can be verified by UPPAAL model checker.

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Formal verification of safety protocol in train control system

Cited by 12 publications

References 32 publications

Object-Oriented Component-Based Design using Behavioral Contracts

Object-Oriented Component-Based Design using Behavioral Contracts

A Formal Security Analysis of ERTMS Train to Trackside Protocols

Study on formal modeling and verification of safety computer platform

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