Formal Verification of a SHA-1 Circuit Core Using ACL2

Toma, Diana; Borrione, D.

doi:10.1007/11541868_21

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…The cache checking unit (CCU) and parallel checking are optimizations to the Sentry worth the added complexity. The size and design complexity of the MAC engines in the CCU is comparable to other functional units already present on both the processor and the Sentry, and MAC engines have been formally verified [91]. The processor performs much of the Merkle tree and cache control logic for the Sentry,…”

Section: Simplicity Of the Sentrymentioning

confidence: 87%

Architectural Support for Containment-based Security

Zhang

Ghosh

Fix

et al. 2019

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Syst

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Software security techniques rely on correct execution by the hardware. Securing hardware components has been challenging due to their complexity and the proportionate attack surface they present during their design, manufacture, deployment, and operation. Recognizing that external communication represents one of the greatest threats to a system's security, this paper introduces the TrustGuard containment architecture. TrustGuard contains malicious and erroneous behavior using a relatively simple and pluggable gatekeeping hardware component called the Sentry. The Sentry bridges a physical gap between the untrusted system and its external interfaces. TrustGuard allows only communication that results from the correct execution of trusted software, thereby preventing the ill effects of actions by malicious hardware or software from leaving the system. The simplicity and pluggability of the Sentry, which is implemented in less than half the lines of code of a simple in-order processor, enables additional measures to secure this root of trust, including formal verification, supervised manufacture, and supply chain diversification with less than a 15% impact on performance. CCS Concepts • Security and privacy → Hardware security implementation.

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Section: Simplicity Of the Sentrymentioning

confidence: 87%

Architectural Support for Containment-based Security

Zhang

Ghosh

Fix

et al. 2019

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Syst

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“…To our best knowledge, Toma and Borrione [35] were the first to use theorem provers to formally verify properties of SHA-1, but their focus is on functional properties, rather than security properties. The first machine-checked proof of security for a hash design appears in [7], where the authors use the CertiCrypt framework to verify that the construction from Brier et al [18] yields a hash function indifferentiable from a random oracle into ordinary elliptic curves.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Verified Security of Merkle-Damgård

Backes

Barthe

Berg

et al. 2012

2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium

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Cryptographic hash functions provide a basic data authentication mechanism and are used pervasively as building blocks to realize many cryptographic functionalities, including block ciphers, message authentication codes, key exchange protocols, and encryption and digital signature schemes. Since weaknesses in hash functions may imply vulnerabilities in the constructions that build upon them, ensuring their security is essential. Unfortunately, many widely used hash functions, including SHA-1 and MD5, are subject to practical attacks. The search for a secure replacement is one of the most active topics in the field of cryptography. In this paper we report on the first machine-checked and independently-verifiable proofs of collision-resistance and indifferentiability of Merkle-Damgård, a construction that underlies many existing hash functions. Our proofs are built and verified using an extension of the EasyCrypt framework, which relies on state-of-the-art verification tools such as automated theorem provers, SMT solvers, and interactive proof assistants.

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“…By functional correctness, we mean that the composition of encryption and decryption yields the original plaintext. Functional correctness of cryptographic protocols has received considerable attention recently in formal verification [16,17]. We refer the reader to Schneier [18] for an overview of cryptosystems.…”

Section: Cbc-mode Encryption and Decryptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Verification Condition Generation Via Theorem Proving

Matthews

Moore

Ray

et al. 2006

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We present a method to convert (i) an operational semantics for a given machine language, and (ii) an off-the-shelf theorem prover, into a high assurance verification condition generator (VCG). Given a program annotated with assertions at cutpoints, we show how to use the theorem prover directly on the operational semantics to generate verification conditions analogous to those produced by a custom-built VCG. Thus no separate VCG is necessary, and the theorem prover can be employed both to generate and to discharge the verification conditions. The method handles both partial and total correctness. It is also compositional in that the correctness of a subroutine needs to be proved once, rather than at each call site. The method has been used to verify several machine-level programs using the ACL2 theorem prover.

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Formal Verification of a SHA-1 Circuit Core Using ACL2

Cited by 9 publications

References 4 publications

Architectural Support for Containment-based Security

Architectural Support for Containment-based Security

Verified Security of Merkle-Damgård

Verification Condition Generation Via Theorem Proving

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Formal Verification of a SHA-1 Circuit Core Using ACL2

Cited by 9 publications

References 4 publications

Architectural Support for Containment-based Security

Architectural Support for Containment-based Security

Verified Security of Merkle-Damg&#x00E5;rd

Verification Condition Generation Via Theorem Proving

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Verified Security of Merkle-Damgård