Formal truth and objective reference in an inferentialist setting

Abstract

The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-repre­sen­ta­tio­nalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege’s and Witt­genstein’s original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theo­ries (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), con­ventionalism (D. Lewis), justificational theories (Dummett, Lorenzen) and, finally, Brandom’s normative pragmatics.

Chapter 2 Dualisms, Distinctions and Unity

“…Rather than with individual sense data, any knowledge begins with an apperception of things in my or your or our present and object‐related Anschauung that I can share with you and others, on the ground of some transformations of perspectives and on the ground of joint conceptual distinctions. (Stekeler‐Weithofer, 2008, p. 14)…”