Formal and informal governance mechanisms in state-owned enterprises

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the formal and informal governance mechanisms of state-owned enterprises operating in a post-transitional economy of Poland. Design/methodology/approach The study combines legal analysis of Polish regulations in force, review of literature on the Poland’s institutional legacy, and a statistical analysis, based on a data set of 204 management board members, 180 external supervisory board members, and 114 state officials supervising Polish SOEs in 2011. Findings Legally designed relationships among the management board, supervisory board, and the state treasury, represented by the minister and ministry officials, constitute the key formal governance mechanisms in Polish SOEs. They are, however, complemented by relationships between SOEs and their stakeholders and distorted by other informal phenomena, including informal noninstitutional behavior, mechanisms grounded in cognitive and normative institutions, and perception of the relationship structure by the actors themselves. As a result, key corporate governance actors differ in their perception of governance influences upon SOEs. Practical implications This study contributes to policymaking by helping authorities gain a better understanding of the governance challenges in SOEs. Originality/value This paper is one of the first and few empirical studies investigating the issue of formal and informal governance mechanisms in SOEs in post-transitional economies of CEE.

Leadership, religiousness, state ownership of an enterprise and unethical pro-organizational behavior: The mediating role of organizational identification

“…On the one hand, state-owned enterprises benefit from the close ties with the decision-making centers concerned with the economy; on the other hand, they are less flexible in operation for the same reason [ 136 ]. State-owned enterprises are subject to significant protection against competition due to their traditional roles in the economy, relations with the government, and monopolistic or dominant positions in some business sectors [ 137 ].…”

“…The motives for employee engagement in the activities of trade unions are often strongly related to personal benefits and possibilities of having a career in union structures that reach beyond a single enterprise [ 149 ]. The strong role of trade unions in SOEs in Poland prompts the conclusion that if employees of SOEs do get involved in any unethical conduct, it is not unethical pro-organizational behavior [ 136 ].…”

“…This causes employees of SOEs to identify with their organization to a greater extent than employees of private companies. Employees and the trade unions that represent them are a significant source of influence on state-owned enterprises [ 136 ]. This causes greater identification with the organization and thinking in terms of “enterprise is us” [ 136 ].…”

Socially Responsible Leadership’s Impact on Stakeholder Management, Staff Job Satisfaction and Work Engagement

“…The companies were either present in the capital market, stock-exchange listed (10 companies) or included in investment fund portfolios (5 companies). Hybrid companies are susceptible to tensions between public and private owners whose objectives tend to contradict one another, and their boards are governed by different institutional logics (Bruton et al, 2015;Vining and Laurin, 2020;Wasowska and Postula, 2018).…”

The influence of board members with foreign experience on the timely delivery of financial reports

“…Thirdly, as we have drawn our data from Poland, the study provides some insight into the Polish corporate governance system. Poland is characterised by a relatively new capital market with significant ownership concentration (Byrka-Kita et al 2018), along with corporate governance mechanisms that are still developing (Aluchna and Koładkiewicz 2010;Dobija and Klimczak 2010;Koładkiewicz 2012;Wąsowska and Postula 2018). Thus, research on a board's ability to monitor control functions and impact FRQ in this context is limited.…”