Forging an indirect strategy in southeast Asia

Terrorism in Southeast Asia: expert analysis, myopia and fantasy

“…The corresponding recommendations call for more inclusive American diplomacy and outreach to 'moderate' Muslims, as if the problem was largely a public relations bungle, not an issue of fundamental US policy (e.g. Desker and Ramakrishna 2002;Gunaratna 2003: 310-18;Rabasa 2003: 72-3).…”

“…16 Rabasa's main concern is conveyed in chapter titles such as 'Indonesia: the Jihad project' and 'Islamic militancy in Malaysia and Singapore'. The categories 'liberal' and 'literal' Islam serve as a similar framing device in a study which declares itself to be about 'Islam and society' but is actually concerned with prospects for the state-led war on terror (see Desker 2002). 17 On the Malaysian government's skilful use of these categories see Farish (2003).…”

“…17 On the Malaysian government's skilful use of these categories see Farish (2003). 18 Studies that exemplify this approach include Desker (2002), Desker and Ramakrishna (2002), Rabasa (2003) and Millard (2004). 19 The same author notes, however, that MUI's statement accusing the US of double standards on human rights and arguing that its attack on Afghanistan was an act of injustice and terrorism also condemned the 11 September attacks and opposed vigilante actions against Americans (see Sukma 2002: 184).…”

“…20 Abuza mentions, in a footnote, that the CIA supported the Pakistani policy to recruit foreign fighters for the mujahidin in Afghanistan (see Abuza 2003: 29). 21 Works that adopt this approach include Desker (2002), Abuza (2003), Rabasa (2003), Millard (2004) and Ramakrishna (2004). 22 As noted in another context, 'rather than fidelity to prophetic precedents, then, the Islamist dream of an all-encompassing religious governance bespeaks a modern bias, one that is all too familiar in the twentieth-century West.…”

Australia's security and the threat of Islamic extremism in southeast Asia

“…Already a spread of opinion exists, with Owen Harries inviting Australians to 'dance with the devil', by rebuilding links to Kopassus, and Downer speculating openly that a new objective for Australian aid monies should be the strengthening of the education sector in rural Indonesia, where Islamic radicalism readily gains access to many of its followers (Harries 2002;Wilkinson 2002). Some regional academics are already insisting that the war to root out Southeast Asian terrorism must be understood as 'a political and ideological war for the hearts and minds of the borderless, transnational Muslim state, or ummah' (Desker and Ramakrishna 2002). Great delicacy will be required here if the key bilateral relationship with Indonesia is to bear the weight of the associated political traffic.…”