This article argues that, over the decades, Australians have held three different, coherent, long-lived 'visions' of nuclear weapons and strategy. Those visions*/ which we have labelled Menzian, Gortonian and disarmer*/ compete on four grounds: the role that nuclear weapons play in international order; the doctrine of deterrence; the importance of arms control; and the relevance of nuclear weapons to Australia's specific needs. We believe this 'textured' framework provides a richer, more satisfying, and more accurate understanding of Australian nuclear identity, both past and present, than previous scholarship has yielded. Moreover, the competition between the three visions might not be at an end. Changes in international norms, in proliferation rates, in regional strategic dynamics, or even in the deterrence doctrines of the major powers could easily reawaken some old, enduring debates. Australian nuclear identity faces an uncertain future.In a conference room in New Delhi in 2001, a leading Indian academic patiently explained to a visiting Australian delegation that India did not have a single view of its nuclear strategy. Rather, he said, it had three competing schools, even if he counted only those within the mainstream debate. The relative influence of those schools waxed and waned in response to domestic and international pressures. The schools*/ broadly, rejectionism, pragmatism and maximalism (Bajpai 2000)*/ all agreed that nuclear weapons were necessary for India's security, but differed over the nature of nuclear deterrence, the importance of various arms control agreements, and whether elimination of nuclear weapons was either feasible or desirable.In this article, we argue that Australians, too, hold three different visions of the bomb. (We use the term 'visions' here*/ rather than 'schools' or 'perspectives'*/ to reflect the different groups' focus on ideals and frameworks, rather than on instructive mechanisms or mere relational perceptions.) The visions do not overlap perfectly with their Indian counterparts. Australia, as a US ally, is a direct beneficiary of extended nuclear deterrence, and has no nuclear weapons of its own. But Australians have, over time, indulged in a *Christine Leah is a doctoral candidate in the