Forest insurance market participants’ game behavior in China: An analysis based on tripartite dynamic game model

Ma, Ning; Zuo, Yang; Liu, Kaili; Qi, Yue

doi:10.3926/jiem.1550

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…As a result, continued increase in the subsidy ratio will only lead to financial pressure. These findings are consistent with the researches of Sauter [35] and Ma [36]. The management enlightenment is that in order to solve the problem of insufficient supply and demand in the current forest insurance industry, we should consider the differentiated premium subsidy policy and the multilevel subsidy system.…”

Section: Impact Of the Probability Of Deforestation Occurrencesupporting

confidence: 88%

“…There are few studies on indirect subsidies (subsidies for insurance companies). These researchers emphasized that to stimulate insurance companies to innovate forest insurance products and increase insurance supply, the government should take measures such as subsidizing the insurance company's business expenses and giving it certain tax preferences [34][35][36]. Overall, the current papers on how to improve the efficiency of direct subsidies (subsidies to forestry enterprises) are still based on qualitative discussion, which inevitably can be driven either by the personal subjectivity of researchers or by organized interests.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategies of Forestry Carbon Sink under Forest Insurance and Subsidies

Song

Peng

2019

Sustainability

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We take the forest insurance supply chain, composed of a forestry enterprise and an insurance company, as the research object. The forestry carbon sink, operated by the forestry enterprise, is the subject matter of insurance. The Stackelberg game model is constructed to study the optimal strategies of the forestry enterprise and insurance company under the forest insurance mechanism, as well as the impact of government subsidies, probability of deforestation, and carbon limit level on the decision-making and profit of the forestry enterprise and insurance company. The results show that the larger the carbon limit, the looser carbon restraint policy, which causes the forestry enterprise to reduce the scale of carbon sink forest, and the insurance company lowers the premium level. As the probability of deforestation increases, both the scale of the carbon sink forest and the premium level will decrease. Direct subsidies for the premiums of the forestry enterprise are conducive to expanding the scale of carbon sink forest, but will lead to the insurance company improving the premium level. Providing indirect subsidies to the insurance company’s operating costs will not only expand the scale of the carbon sink forest, but also lower the premium level. In the case of the same number of premium subsidies, indirect subsidies are more effective than direct subsidies in increasing the forestry enterprise’s income and promoting it to expand the forest scale.

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Section: Impact Of the Probability Of Deforestation Occurrencesupporting

confidence: 88%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategies of Forestry Carbon Sink under Forest Insurance and Subsidies

Song

Peng

2019

Sustainability

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“…In the forest insurance market, it is necessary to enable all multi-stakeholders including government, insurance company and forest farmers to participate in the implementation of forest insurance actively (Ma et al, 2015). There is no central authority to control behaviors of forest farmers in the forest insurance market, and forest farmers decide to purchase forest insurance or not based on their own conditions.…”

Section: Forest Insurance Policy Simulation In Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on forest insurance policy simulation in China

Zuo

2019

FER

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Purpose Forest insurance is a popular way to reduce the loss of forest disasters, so it is necessary to actively involve stakeholders. In the multi-agent simulation model, the government, insurance companies and forest farmers participate as three main stakeholders. The purpose of this paper is to mainly simulate the behavior of forest farmers under different environmental variables in order to find the important factors affecting the coverage of forest insurance, so as to improve the ability of forest farmers to resist risks in the face of disasters. Design/methodology/approach In the simulation process, the decision-making rule of a forest farmer’s purchasing behavior is a binary selection chain, which is created at random. Forest farmer agents who adapt to the environment will remain; on the contrary, those will be eliminated. The eliminated agents will renew their behavior selection chains through learning others’ successful behavior based on genetic algorithm. The multi-agent mode is set up on the Eclipse platform by using Java language. Findings The adjustment simulation experiments of insurance premium, insurance subsidy and forest area were carried out. According to the result, conclusions and suggestions are as follows: at present, government subsidies are necessary for the implementation of forest insurance; in the future, with the expansion of the insured forest area and the upgrading and large-scale operation of forest farms, forest farmers will be more willing to join forest insurance program, and, then, the implementation of forest insurance no longer requires government subsidies for forest insurance premiums. Originality/value This paper explores the impact of three important factors on the implementation of forest insurance.

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“…Güth (2007) analyzed buyer insurance and seller reputation in online markets applying an evolutionary framework. Ma (2015) explored complex and dynamic game relationship among participants in the forest insurance market based on a tripartite evolutionary game model. Gao (2017) applied evolutionary game theory to discuss and analyze selection behavior of trans-regional hospitals and patients in a telemedicine system.…”

Section: B Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2019

IRFC

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Forest insurance market participants’ game behavior in China: An analysis based on tripartite dynamic game model

Cited by 5 publications

References 17 publications

Strategies of Forestry Carbon Sink under Forest Insurance and Subsidies

Strategies of Forestry Carbon Sink under Forest Insurance and Subsidies

Research on forest insurance policy simulation in China

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