Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts

Aydın, Ayşegül

doi:10.11126/stanford/9780804782814.001.0001

Cited by 26 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Blanton & Apodaca (2007), Bussmann & Schneider (2007), and Martin, Mayer & Thoenig (2008) corroborate these dampening effects that economic openness has on civil conflict occurrence. Others including Aydin (2012), Kathman (2011), andStojek &Chacha (2015) see the extent of beneficial economic ties with other states influencing the likelihood that third-party actors will intervene in civil conflicts that threaten their economic interests in the affected countries.…”

Section: Economic Interdependence the Capitalist Peace And Domestic Civil Disturbancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investing in stability

Powell

Chacha

2016

Journal of Peace Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The capitalist peace thesis argues transnational economic ties have a pacifying effect on interstate relations. An extension of this literature reports that economic ties can prompt belligerents in civil conflicts to peacefully resolve their disputes and can attract third-party intervention from states with strong economic ties. This pacifying effect of economic ties, we argue, is applicable in the context of coups d’état: as a state becomes more economically interdependent with the rest of the world, the opportunity costs of domestic political disturbances are raised for both the targeted state and its financial partners. These costs – potential economic losses and a damaged economic reputation – influence belligerents in the state to use constitutional means to resolve their disputes while providing stronger incentives to foreign economic partners to influence the calculus of these belligerents as they consider the coup attempt. We test this argument quantitatively by investigating the influence of a dozen indicators of economic openness on coups in a global sample of states from 1952 to 2007. Our findings demonstrate the applicability of the capitalist peace thesis to coups d’état, manifestations of political uncertainty that are less likely to be accompanied by substantial loss of life or destruction of infrastructure.

show abstract

Section: Economic Interdependence the Capitalist Peace And Domestic Civil Disturbancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investing in stability

Powell

Chacha

2016

Journal of Peace Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In addition to counter-arguments pertaining to the role of anti-communism, I take up three alternative explanations. The first focuses on the role of economic interests as a driver of US behavior (Morrow 1999;Aydin 2012). It is clear that economic nationalization under Allende ignited support for hard-line policies from many in the US business community.…”

Section: Chile 1963-1973: the Rise And Fall Of Salvador Allendementioning

confidence: 99%

Stasis or Decay? Reconciling Covert War and the Democratic Peace

Poznansky

2015

Int Stud Q

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Democratic states sometimes engage in covert interventions—sometimes involving forcible regime change—against other democracies. Critics charge that these interventions raise doubts about the robustness of the “democratic peace.” I argue that they require analysts to rethink some aspects of democratic‐peace theory. Democratic states base their behavior toward other democracies on expectations about the future trajectory of their regimes: whether, and to what extent, those states will likely remain democratic in the future. When they expect democracy to persist, the constraints of the democratic peace operate. But when democracies expect another state's democratic character to break down, or decay, they prove more willing to engage in covert forcible regime change. I test my dynamic version of democratic‐peace theory by examining US efforts to forcibly depose Iran's Mohammed Mossadegh (1953) and Chile's Salvador Allende (1970–1973). The framework developed here helps to resolve a longstanding anomaly for the democratic peace—secret interventions between democracies—while also providing policymakers with a clearer sense of the stakes associated with covert democracy promotion and subversion.

show abstract

“…Kathman (2011) shows that a state with substantial trade ties to a particular region is more likely to intervene in a civil conflict in that region than in a conflict in an economically insignificant region. Finally, Aydin (2012) devotes significant attention to economic factors influencing intervention decisions, finding some evidence that trade increases the probability of intervention. More importantly Aydin's (2012) study probes the difference between biased and unbiased (mediation) interventions; our study expands this inquiry and examines how economic ties influence rebel-and government-side interventions differently.…”

Section: Conflict Characteristics and Motivations For Interventionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Third-party interventions have long been considered one of the most important events in civil war processes, affecting both duration and outcome of these conflicts (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce, 2008;Gent, 2008). While extant accounts typically assume motives such as preference for ending the conflict or affecting its outcome in favor of a particular side, relatively few quantitative studies attempt direct modeling of factors influencing the probability of intervention (see Kathman, 2011;Lemke & Regan, 2004;Aydin, 2012). If interventions do matter for civil war processes, investigation of what makes them more or less probable is an important antecedent to discussions of their effectsincluding war duration and outcome, or even their supposed peace-promoting potential (see Fortna, 2008;Shelton, Stojek & Sullivan, 2013).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Adding trade to the equation

Stojek

Chacha

2015

Journal of Peace Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Third-party interventions have long been considered one of the most important events in civil war processes, affecting both duration and outcome of these conflicts. Understanding what affects probability of intervention in support of government or rebels is thus crucial. Interestingly, comparatively little attention has been paid to explanations of why third-party states intervene in civil conflicts of other states and even fewer studies model economic motivations for interventions. Our study focuses on the extent to which bilateral trade ties influence states’ decisions to intervene in conflicts of important trading partners. We model the influence of formal trade ties on the probability of pro-government and pro-rebel interventions. The argument asserts that trade ties work in ways similar to existing strategic alliances – favoring intervention on the side of the government rather than the opposition. The analyses use a multilevel modeling method, which enables us to appropriately model two levels of observed variables: conflict characteristics, the same for all potential interveners, and dyadic ties, varying across potential interveners. The findings support the role of bilateral trade ties in motivating interventions, and specifically in predicting interventions on the side of the embattled government. Our contribution is especially informative given the post-WWII exponential increase in both civil war phenomena and economic interdependence.

show abstract

Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts

Cited by 26 publications

References 0 publications

Investing in stability

Investing in stability

Stasis or Decay? Reconciling Covert War and the Democratic Peace

Adding trade to the equation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About