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2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.013
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Foreign institutional investors and corporate governance in emerging markets: Evidence of a split-share structure reform in China

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Cited by 223 publications
(156 citation statements)
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“…The A‐shares were mainly available to Chinese investors, whereas B‐shares were mainly available to foreign investors. This study includes only A‐shares, as (a) B‐shares are priced in foreign currency, (b) only approximately 10% of Chinese firms issue offshore shares (i.e., B‐, H‐, and N‐shares), and (c) total market capitalization of B‐shares is less than 0.5% of the total capitalization on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (Huang & Zhu, ; Jiang & Kim, ).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The A‐shares were mainly available to Chinese investors, whereas B‐shares were mainly available to foreign investors. This study includes only A‐shares, as (a) B‐shares are priced in foreign currency, (b) only approximately 10% of Chinese firms issue offshore shares (i.e., B‐, H‐, and N‐shares), and (c) total market capitalization of B‐shares is less than 0.5% of the total capitalization on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (Huang & Zhu, ; Jiang & Kim, ).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, compared to domestic peers, foreign institutional investors are less likely to have business dealings with local investee firms and therefore are more independent monitors of the management (Gillan and Starks 2003;Aggarwal et al 2011). Second, foreign institutional investors are less prone to local political pressure and therefore more resistant to nonshareholder value maximizing decisions by managers (Huang and Zhu 2015;Tsang et al 2016 H2 (Global Investor Hypothesis): Because of their proclivity toward activism and ability to deploy superior monitoring technologies, foreign institutional investors have a comparative advantage over their domestic peers in constraining earnings management.…”
Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In China, foreign mutual funds are found to be more effective in that regard, as local mutual funds appear to yield to political pressure (Firth et al, 2010). Huang and Zhu (2015) show that foreign institutional investors are less prone to political pressure and that they are more likely to perform arm's-length monitoring.…”
Section: The Impact Of Corporate Governance Practices On Firm Performmentioning
confidence: 99%