Foreign banks and credit stability in Central and Eastern Europe. A panel data analysis

Haas, Ralph De; Lelyveld, Iman van

doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.07.007

Cited by 422 publications

(211 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…This is in line with the empirical findings of DeHaas and Van Lelyveld (2006), who capture the importance of local expertise by dividing foreign subsidiaries into greenfields and take-overs. Take-overs of already existing local banks are typically associated with employing the former management and employees, which are better informed about local markets.…”

supporting

confidence: 89%

International Banking and Liquidity Allocation

Dietrich

Vollmer

2009

J Financ Serv Res

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supporting

confidence: 89%

International Banking and Liquidity Allocation

Dietrich

Vollmer

2009

J Financ Serv Res

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“…This technique has been used extensively in the banking literature to control for endogeneity problems (cf. Degryse et al, 2012;de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006). Under this approach, first within estimations are performed.…”

Section: Model and Data Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supervisory powers and bank risk taking

Shehzad

Haan

2015

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Mo

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a b s t r a c tWe examine the effect of different types of bank supervisory powers in place before the crisis on bank risk-taking during the crisis. We employ data of more than 8000 banks from high-income OECD countries for the 2007-2011 period and impaired loans to gross loans ratio as proxy for bank risk-taking. Our Hausman-Taylor estimates indicate that the powers of bank supervisors to shake up the organizational structure of banks are more effective than powers to issue monetary penalties. Our results also suggest that supervisory powers do not affect risk-taking behavior of systemically important banks.

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“…Levine, 1996;Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996;Kroszner, 1998;Peek and Rosengren, 2000;Claessens et al, 2001;Haas and Lelyveld, 2005). In contrast, Stiglitz (1993) and Peek and Rosengren (2000) point out a number of potential costs associated with foreign banks entry such as weakening of domestic banks from increased competition and adverse foreign shocks to domestic markets from repercussions on foreign banks.…”

Section: Competition Related Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis

Pasiouras

Gaganis

Zopounidis

2006

Rev Quant Finan Acc

126

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We use country level data and bank level data from 71 countries and 857 banks to investigate the impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings. The results indicate that less cost efficient banks, with higher than average levels of provisions relatively to their income, and lower liquidity tend to have lower ratings. Larger and more profitable banks tend to obtain higher ratings. Higher equity to assets ratio results in higher ratings only when we do not control for bank supervision and regulations. Capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities, official disciplinary power, explicit deposit insurance scheme, higher deposit insurer power, liquidity and diversification guidelines, entry requirements, fraction of entries denied, and economic freedom have a significant impact on ratings in all of our specifications. Disclosure requirements and foreign banks entry have a significant impact on ratings only when we simultaneously control for the regulatory environment and the market structure, while auditing requirements have a significant impact only when we control for the regulatory environment alone. Finally, banks in developed countries are assigned higher ratings. However, this impact disappears when we include the regulatory and supervision variables in the models. © 2006 Springer Science + Business Media, LLC

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Foreign banks and credit stability in Central and Eastern Europe. A panel data analysis

Cited by 422 publications

References 29 publications

International Banking and Liquidity Allocation

International Banking and Liquidity Allocation

Supervisory powers and bank risk taking

The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis

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