For reflexivity as an epistemic criterion of ontological coherence and virtuous social theorizing

Abstract

This article offers an approach that combines, on the one hand, the philosophical notion of reflexivity, which is related to the ideas of self-reference and paradox, and, on the other hand, the sociological discussion of epistemic reflexivity as a problem of coherence, which was mainly initiated by certain branches of ethnomethodology and social constructionism. This combinatory approach argues for reflexivity as an epistemic criterion of ontological coherence, which suggests that social ontologies should account for the possibility of self-reflective subjectivity – for otherwise they result in a paradoxical conclusion according to which a social scientist reflects on her or his ontological commitments even though these commitments deny her or him the capacity for self-reflection. This analysis presupposes that all human sciences are categorically premised on social ontologies; and it argues for an analytical distinction between self-reflection, which refers to the agential capacity for reflecting on one’s own commitments, and the epistemic criterion of reflexivity hereby proposed. These two analytically distinct though interdependent socio-theoretical concepts are frequently conflated in the literature; thus, this article also aims at a ‘clearing of the ground’ that can be of categorical use to the human sciences.

The two stories of the habitus/structure relation and the riddle of reflexivity: A meta‐theoretical reappraisal

“…In contrast, we start from the idea that self‐reflection is an antinomic residual category in Bourdieu's work and move to the conclusion that his epistemic request cannot be supported for this very reason. Our argument is that these authors fail to distinguish between epistemic reflexivity as theoretical auto‐reference and the idea of self‐reflection (Bouzanis, ), and therefore, in terms of Bourdieu's work, they conflate an epistemic request with a residual category of HS/P1. Ultimately this means that they try to extend an unattainable possibility that pertains, according to Bourdieu, only to sociologists (see, Bohman, , p. 182; Karakayali, , p. 160), to other social groups.…”

“…In order to show this, we decompose Bourdieu's quite complex requirement for a reflexive sociology into three analytically distinct moments, evaluating each of these: Auto‐reference : To start this analysis, we need to distinguish between, on the one hand, self‐reflection, or agential reflexivity, as an agential capacity to critically reflect on beliefs, values, world‐views and assumptions, as well as the wider or local, cultural or structural context; and, on the other hand, epistemic reflexivity as pointing to the paradoxes of self‐reference in the sociology of knowledge (Bohman, , pp. 173, 177), or to the auto‐referential properties of grande theoretical frameworks (Bouzanis, ). It is this latter interest in self‐reference and its consequences which Bourdieu is promoting in the discussion of epistemic reflexivity.…”

“…It is this latter interest in self‐reference and its consequences which Bourdieu is promoting in the discussion of epistemic reflexivity. Bouzanis () states that Bourdieu was a pioneer in that he reflexively (that is, auto‐referentially) bent his proposed core concepts to “apply” them to (the explanation of the position of) the social scientist and the field of symbolic struggles, within which s/he is positioned. This means that Bourdieu analyzes the space of position‐taking for the social scientist as the possible and permitted sets of strategies and visions of the world, which are defined (in terms of probabilities) by the social scientific field through the prism of the dispositions of the habitus (Bourdieu, , p. 58); and this clearly shows that he recognizes the applicability of his core concepts to the academic field as well (see, Bourdieu, ).…”

“…Note that these efforts do not in principle confine self‐reflection to social scientists and their conduct, but rather examine the theoretical possibility of the diffusion among the population of the capacity of critical examination of ideas and worldviews. This acknowledgement can be combined with an analysis of the capacity to reflect on situational logics in relation to the critical choice among different principles and values that can be applied to judgements and decisions that are made in and through interaction within various microcosms (for further discussion on this, see Bohman, ; Boltanski & Thévenot, , ; Bouzanis, ; Telling, ).…”

“…To properly locate Bourdieu's remarks we argue for the importance of distinguishing epistemic reflexivity, on the one hand, from self‐reflection/agential reflexivity, on the other. By epistemic reflexivity we mean the application of socio‐theoretical systems to their own academic microcosm, such that the general characterizations of social relations put forward within a theoretical system have an (explicit or implicit) import for the analysis of the conditions of theory‐production themselves (see, Bouzanis, ). In other words it is the self‐application of a theory.…”