The two stories of the habitus/structure relation and the riddle of reflexivity: A meta‐theoretical reappraisal

Abstract

This article argues that two key puzzles arising from the theories of Bourdieu are inter‐related. One is the question of how Bourdieu analyses the relationship between structure and habitus, and the other is the place of reflexivity in Bourdieu's work. We contend that it is only by carefully analysing Bourdieu's theoretical structure to grasp the relationship between these elements that one can understand whether or not his work offers useful resources for analysing the relation between routine action and self‐reflection. This paper argues that there are two narrations of the structure/habitus relation in Bourdieu's work, and that the concept of self‐reflective subjectivity is a residual element of the first narration and does not appear in the second. We then contend that this residual and under‐developed concept of self‐reflective subjectivity should not be confused with Bourdieu's analysis of epistemic reflexivity. These moves allow us to contribute to ongoing debates about the relation between routine action and self‐reflection by arguing that the concept of the “reflexive habitus” – which some have argued is characteristic of social agents in high/late modernity – is both conceptually confused and is not a logical extension of Bourdieu's theories. In this way we try to clear the ground for more productive ways of thinking about routine action and self‐reflection.

Putting an End to the Tragedy of Ranching in Napoleon Wrasse Fishery in Indonesia: A Sociological Approach

“…This individual hindrance to self-transformation is due to the dispossession of rational choice (Hayes, 2020). However, Bourdieu proposes that individual possesses the ability to produce a reflection through reflexivity and to influence other (Bouzanis & Kemp, 2020;Caetano, 2017;Wacquant, 2001).…”

Theorizing the Religious Habitus in the Context of Conversion to Islam among Polish Women of Catholic Background

“…Probably the most consistent criticism pertains to the growing discontinuity of contemporary biographies and the usefulness of the habitus in studying individuals engaging with rapidly changing social realities (Archer 2012;Decoteau 2016;Mellor and Shelling 2014). One of the main concerns is the supposed determinism inherent in Bourdieu's conceptualization of habitus precluding any challenge to the status quo (Bouzanis and Kemp 2019;Jenkins 1982;King 2000;Trzebiatowska 2014). Bourdieu himself allows for habitus change, although he gives more weight to the stability over time and highlights hysteresis-the lag occurring in the change of habitus unadjusted to the new logic and structure of the field (Wacquant 2004:392).…”

“…It has been argued that such a conceptualization of habitus is irreconcilable with individual agency (Archer 2012). Some commentators, however, note that the criticism stems from some inconsistencies, or fluctuations of emphasis in Bourdieu's writing (Bouzanis and Kemp 2019;Crossley 2001;Decoteau 2016;Hilgers 2009;King 2000;Noble and Watkins 2003). In his late writings, Bourdieu explicitly acknowledges the possibility of "'self-work' that enables the individual to get a handle on his or her dispositions" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:133).…”

On the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity

“…Putting aside the fact that Archer (2010a) thinks that Elder-Vass misinterprets Bourdieu and simplifies her own account of agential reflexivity, and leaving aside the interesting question of whether Bourdieu really allowed for levels of self-reflection (see Archer, 2010aArcher, , 2010bBouzanis and Kemp, 2020), it is important to state at this point that the expression conscious decision generates more issues than is helpful, because self-reflection is assumed to be the socio-theoretical alternative to outdated philosophical versions of cogito(s) and, although sophisticated, Elder-Vass' approach tacitly conflates routine action and habitual action. Non-reflective action is not exhausted in Bourdieu's habitus, let alone in Elder-Vass' notion of dispositions, and social reproduction is not necessarily the result of non-reflective action.…”