2015
DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.2036-14.2015
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fMRI and EEG Predictors of Dynamic Decision Parameters during Human Reinforcement Learning

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Cited by 225 publications
(310 citation statements)
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References 44 publications
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“…In line with a number of these accounts, we recently proposed that dACC integrates controlrelevant values (including factors such as reward, conflict, and error likelihood) to make adjustments to candidate control signals (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). In this setting, one of multiple potentially relevant control signals is the decision threshold for the current and future trials, adjustments of which have been found to be triggered by current trial conflict (i.e., difficulty) and mediated by dACC and surrounding regions (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014;Cavanagh et al, 2011;Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011;Frank et al, 2015;Kerns et al, 2004). Our findings also do not rule out the possibility that dACC activity will in other instances track the likelihood of switching rather than sticking with one's current strategy-as has been observed in numerous studies of default override (see Shenhav et al, 2013)-over and above signals related to choice difficulty.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In line with a number of these accounts, we recently proposed that dACC integrates controlrelevant values (including factors such as reward, conflict, and error likelihood) to make adjustments to candidate control signals (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). In this setting, one of multiple potentially relevant control signals is the decision threshold for the current and future trials, adjustments of which have been found to be triggered by current trial conflict (i.e., difficulty) and mediated by dACC and surrounding regions (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014;Cavanagh et al, 2011;Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011;Frank et al, 2015;Kerns et al, 2004). Our findings also do not rule out the possibility that dACC activity will in other instances track the likelihood of switching rather than sticking with one's current strategy-as has been observed in numerous studies of default override (see Shenhav et al, 2013)-over and above signals related to choice difficulty.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, the Bayesian hierarchical framework has been shown to be especially effective when the number of observations is low [28]. Third and more importantly, this framework supports the use of other variables as regressors of the model parameters to assess relations of the model parameters with other physiological or behavioral data [29][30][31][32]. This property of the HDDM allowed us to establish the link between the results of the brain-behavior coupling analysis and the model parameters.…”
Section: Hierarchical Drift Diffusion Modelling Ofmentioning
confidence: 72%
“…In addition to this rapid cortically-mediated form of adaptation, evidence suggests that strategic adjustments in decision threshold are achieved via activity-dependent plasticity in the connections between STN and GPe [24,58] . In the current study, adaptive changes in the boundary height accounted for the observed post-error slowing in responses following failed stop trials, motivated by neuroimaging and electrophysiological evidence STN-mediated slowing of responses [9,17,26] . For simplicity, boundary adaption was restricted to being unidirectional -increasing after a stop-error and decaying back to, but never below, its original value.…”
Section: Drift-rate: Dopaminergic Modulation Of Corticostriatal Pathwaysmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…One reason for this is that computational models of learning [1,2] and control [3][4][5] have historically emerged from disparate lines of empirical research (see [6,7] for exceptions), adding difficulty to the already challenging task of inferring cognitive phenomena from gross behavioral measures. Recently, however, insights from cognitive and computational neuroscience have begun to shed light on the interaction of cognitive processes in neural circuits, providing additional empirical anchors for grounding theoretical assumptions [8][9][10][11] .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%