Flesh: Towards the History of a Misunderstanding

Carbone, Mauro

doi:10.5840/chiasmi2002413

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“…Alloa (2009Alloa ( , 2017 explains why such an identification would not be accurate, and similarly Barbaras (2008) and Slatman (2005) explain how Merleau-Ponty's concept has an original meaning that is not reducible to a Husserlian position. See also Carbone (2002) for a discussion on the notions of chair, Körper, and Leib in a wider context. dynamically dependent on the exploratory activity of a Leib, this relationship cannot be a "point by point correspondence" (233/282).…”

Section: Flesh As An Ontological Elementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontology

Halák¹

2021

The Southern J of Philosophy

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This article reconsiders Husserl's concept of Leib in light of Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the human body as an ontologically significant phenomenon. I first analyze Husserl's account of the body as a "two-fold unity" and demonstrate the problematic nature of its four implications, namely, the ambiguous ontological status of the body as subject-object, the view of "my body" as "my object," the preconstitutive character of the unity of the body, and the restriction of the constitution of the body to touch alone. Building on this analysis, I explain how Merleau-Ponty resolves the difficulties raised by Husserl's account by reversing it. According to Merleau-Ponty, "flesh" is not a two-fold reality comprising subjective and objective aspects, but an ontological dimension from which these aspects can be abstracted through specific cognitive operations. Consequently, all subjective and objective aspects, even beyond the boundaries of one's body, must be understood as founded in the indivisible unity of flesh. I argue that a thorough phenomenological description of the human body requires abandoning Husserl's concept of Leib because it contributes to perpetuating subject-object dualism. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh reveals the circularity between subject and object and its general ontological significance.

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Section: Flesh As An Ontological Elementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontology

Halák¹

2021

The Southern J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Flesh: Towards the History of a Misunderstanding

Cited by 1 publication

References 0 publications

Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontology

Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontology

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