Fittingness

Howard, Christopher

doi:10.1111/phc3.12542

Cited by 80 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…As we have seen, reasons-responsiveness and cognitive dependence are plausibly related by the fact that it is in part in virtue of their being based on certain cognitive states 55 Views that tie fittingness/appropriateness/merit to normative reasons, although in different ways, are in fact standard in the philosophy of normativity. For an overview, see Howard (2018). 56 The account of merit sketched here should dispel the worry that what I take to be intrinsic correctness conditions on action might in fact be conditions on intention.…”

Section: How About Intentionality Phenomenology and Passivity?mentioning

confidence: 94%

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Emotion: More like Action than Perception

Naar

2020

Erkenn

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Although some still advance reductive accounts of emotions—according to which they fall under a more familiar type of mental state—contemporary philosophers tend to agree that emotions probably constitute their own kind of mental state. Agreeing with this claim, however, is compatible with attempting to find commonalities between emotions and better understood things. According to the advocates of the so-called ‘perceptual analogy’, thinking of emotion in terms of perception can fruitfully advance our understanding even though emotion may not be reducible to ordinary perception. In this paper, I spell out and motivate a different analogy—that between emotion and action—an analogy which I think can do some important theoretical work. In particular, it constitutes a theoretically fruitful way to think about core aspects of emotions and might in fact be employed to provide a better account of certain aspects of emotions than the one based on the perceptual analogy. Emotions might not be a matter of seeing the world a certain way, but a matter of behaving internally in response to it. In a slogan form: Emotion is the inward counterpart of bodily movement.

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Section: How About Intentionality Phenomenology and Passivity?mentioning

confidence: 94%

“…In that literature, the notion is generally understood normatively. For discussion, see Howard (2018). 51 Like expressivism in metaethics, perceptualism in the philosophy of emotion should be seen as a research program whereby we investigate how far we can defend a certain picture.…”

Section: The Action Analogy Better Captures Conflict With Belief and mentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotion: More like Action than Perception

Naar

2020

Erkenn

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“…5 See Eshleman (2014) for an overview. 6 For more on correctness, or what I elsewhere call 'fittingness', see Howard (2018) and McHugh and Way (2016). 7 Such disputes between moral theorists are only one relevant point of contention, given that non-moral considerations are also plausibly relevant to choiceworthiness.…”

Section: Good Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

A puzzle about enkratic reasoning

Way

2020

Philos Stud

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Enkratic reasoning—reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing—seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know.

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“…Other terms that appear in the literature and aim to capture the same phenomena are, as mentioned, 'merit' but also 'correct', 'appropriate', and 'worthy'.15 For recent discussions of fittingness and the possibility that fit might be a primitive in our normative theorising, seeMcHugh and Way (2016) and YetterChappell (2012). For an overview of fittingness seeHoward (2018).…”

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confidence: 99%

A puzzle for evaluation theories of desire

Grzankowski

2021

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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How we evaluate things and what we desire are closely connected. In typical cases, the things we desire are things that we evaluate as good or desirable. According to evaluation theories of desire, this connection is a very tight one: desires are evaluations of their objects as good or as desirable. 1 There are two main varieties of this view. According to Doxastic Evaluativism, to desire that p is to believe or judge that p is good. 2 According to Perceptual Evaluativism, to desire that p is to perceive p as being good (or for p to seem good). 3 The present paper poses a puzzle for such views. The puzzle should be familiar to theorists interested in the normativity and metaphysics of the emotions, but I am unaware of its application to desire. 4 The aim of the present paper is to present the puzzle as it applies to desire, which should be of independent interest, but I also hope that by shining a light on the puzzle in this domain, we might put ourselves in a better position to offer a 1 There is room for debate about how the objects of desire are evaluated as being, for example, as good (for the subject/for oneself) or as desirable (for the subject/for oneself). The puzzle I will present gives rise to a recipe that can very easily accommodate choices. For ease of exposition, I will work with evaluations as good. Gregory (2013, 2017) argues that to desire to φ just is to believe that you have normative reason to φ. The puzzle I will raise can be made to apply to this view as well. More below, but to generate the puzzle as applied to Gregory, focus on a pair such as the following: desiring to φ while simultaneously judging that there are no normative reasons to φ.

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Fittingness

Cited by 80 publications

References 49 publications

Emotion: More like Action than Perception

Emotion: More like Action than Perception

A puzzle about enkratic reasoning

A puzzle for evaluation theories of desire

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