2019
DOI: 10.1109/tsg.2017.2784366
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Financially Motivated FDI on SCED in Real-Time Electricity Markets: Attacks and Mitigation

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Cited by 51 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…Considering this theorem, most publications focused on FDIAs that target congested line sets without being detected by the conventional BDD. Similar to [11,[14][15][16][17], this paper assumes that FDIAs are launched without being detected by changing congested lines from their original situations. According to 2 −norm-based residual test, in order to launch an unidentified attack, the following constraint should be satisfied:…”
Section: Undetected False Data Injection Attack On State Estimationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Considering this theorem, most publications focused on FDIAs that target congested line sets without being detected by the conventional BDD. Similar to [11,[14][15][16][17], this paper assumes that FDIAs are launched without being detected by changing congested lines from their original situations. According to 2 −norm-based residual test, in order to launch an unidentified attack, the following constraint should be satisfied:…”
Section: Undetected False Data Injection Attack On State Estimationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Existing EPF methods can be divided into three categories, namely, physical methods, statistical methods, and machine learning methods (Figure 1). Physical methods are based on safety constrained unit commitment (SCUC) and safety constrained economic dispatch (SCED) models to simulate the day-to-day power market situation based on boundary conditions and physical theory [8,9]. Although physical methods are effective from the perspective of predictive logic, their main problem is that the SCUC and SCED models require a large amount of real-time operating data, such as line transmission capacity, electricity load, and competitors' bids, which leads to very complicated calculations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, they both only focus on attacks that cause line overflows. In [10], a financially motivated FDI attack model is analysed and a robust incentive‐reduction strategy is proposed to deter such attacks by protecting a subset of meters. More generally, machine learning techniques are also deployed in detecting LR attacks.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Estimation–detection framework: In this study, we introduce an LR attack detection framework based on support vector models by leveraging the historical load information commonly available to system operators. While there are existing approaches in the literature to prevent attacks by installing new devices [6] or protecting specific measurements [10], guiding operators to utilise existing data available to design software‐based solutions is complementary to those existing approaches. Our method determines the existence of LR attacks directly through the estimated loads, which can be conveniently applied in conjunction with the current EMS operations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%