Compressive beamforming realizes the direction-of-arrival (DOA) estimation and strength quantification of acoustic sources by solving an underdetermined system of equations relating microphone pressures to a source distribution via compressive sensing. The conventional method assumes DOAs of sources to lie on a grid. Its performance degrades due to basis mismatch when the assumption is not satisfied. To overcome this limitation for the measurement with plane microphone arrays, a two-dimensional grid-free compressive beamforming is developed. First, a continuum based atomic norm minimization is defined to denoise the measured pressure and thus obtain the pressure from sources. Next, a positive semidefinite programming is formulated to approximate the atomic norm minimization. Subsequently, a reasonably fast algorithm based on alternating direction method of multipliers is presented to solve the positive semidefinite programming. Finally, the matrix enhancement and matrix pencil method is introduced to process the obtained pressure and reconstruct the source distribution. Both simulations and experiments demonstrate that under certain conditions, the grid-free compressive beamforming can provide high-resolution and low-contamination imaging, allowing accurate and fast estimation of two-dimensional DOAs and quantification of source strengths, even with non-uniform arrays and noisy measurements.
This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being detected via measurements. To overcome the limited information, a multiple linear regression model is developed to learn the relationship between the external network and the attack subnetwork from historical data. The worst possible consequences of such FDI attacks are evaluated by solving a bi-level optimization problem wherein the first level models the limited attack resources, while the second level formulates the system response to such attacks via DC optimal power flow (OPF). The attack model with limited information is reflected in the DC OPF formulation that only takes into account the system information for the attack sub-network. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on the IEEE 24-bus RTS and IEEE 118-bus systems.
Abstract-Physical consequences to power systems of false data injection cyber-attacks are considered. Prior work has shown that the worst-case consequences of such an attack can be determined using a bi-level optimization problem, wherein an attack is chosen to maximize the physical power flow on a target line subsequent to re-dispatch. This problem can be solved as a mixed-integer linear program, but it is difficult to scale to large systems due to numerical challenges. Three new computationally efficient algorithms to solve this problem are presented. These algorithms provide lower and upper bounds on the system vulnerability measured as the maximum power flow subsequent to an attack. Using these techniques, vulnerability assessments are conducted for IEEE 118-bus system and Polish system with 2383 buses.
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