1984
DOI: 10.2307/2297430
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Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary. Diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs, even in a risk neutral economy. The paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentiv… Show more

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Cited by 6,400 publications
(3,798 citation statements)
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References 20 publications
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“…We assume that bankers have an advantage in monitoring projects (Diamond 1984) so that they are more productive than savers, i.e. A B ≥ 1 = A S (for simplicity, only banks generate a social surplus).…”
Section: The Basic Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We assume that bankers have an advantage in monitoring projects (Diamond 1984) so that they are more productive than savers, i.e. A B ≥ 1 = A S (for simplicity, only banks generate a social surplus).…”
Section: The Basic Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…His research (see, e.g., Diamond 1984 and1996) concludes that investors are keener to lend their free financial resources to banks, which subsequently lend them to borrowers, rather than lend them themselves directly if the costs of monitoring of borrowers are too high for the investors. Banks have, in comparison with individual investors, an advantage that they are able to monitor borrowers more efficiently.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, due to the unique institutional background (such as weak legal enforcement, overall poor corporate governance, etc. ), the monitoring role of private ownership over companies is questioned: For example, although most studies on developed markets agree that direct bank ownership provides better capital access to, and better monitoring of, companies (Diamond, 1984;Barth et al, 2006), Lin, Zhang, and Zhu (2009) document that bank ownership in China is associated with poorer operating performance, possibly due to inefficient investments.…”
Section: Ownership and Earnings Managementmentioning
confidence: 99%