2000
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.251413
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Finance and Politics: Special Interest Group Influence during the Nationalization and Privatization of Conrail

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Cited by 19 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 33 publications
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“…Furthermore, the monotonic relation between output and the rule of law may not hold if two unproductive activities exist. This paper, therefore, extends work on connected firms (Note 3) (Roberts, 1990;Kroszner & Stratmann, 1998;Ang & Boyer, 2000;Morck, Stangeland & Yeung, 2000;Fisman, 2001;Johnson & Mitton, 2003;Faccio, 2006;among others), and argues that although corrupt investors may be less productive than the average investor (Faccio, 2006), they are located in the more lucrative industries. Moreover, and different from the literature that investigates the role bribes to the government play in income transfer (Grossman &Helpman, 1994 and1995;Dixit et al, 1997;Bulte, Damania, & Lopez, 2007;among others), this paper focuses on how corrupting transition is used by corrupt investors to expropriate others, and shows how this process leads to corruption of some industries, but not others.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 60%
“…Furthermore, the monotonic relation between output and the rule of law may not hold if two unproductive activities exist. This paper, therefore, extends work on connected firms (Note 3) (Roberts, 1990;Kroszner & Stratmann, 1998;Ang & Boyer, 2000;Morck, Stangeland & Yeung, 2000;Fisman, 2001;Johnson & Mitton, 2003;Faccio, 2006;among others), and argues that although corrupt investors may be less productive than the average investor (Faccio, 2006), they are located in the more lucrative industries. Moreover, and different from the literature that investigates the role bribes to the government play in income transfer (Grossman &Helpman, 1994 and1995;Dixit et al, 1997;Bulte, Damania, & Lopez, 2007;among others), this paper focuses on how corrupting transition is used by corrupt investors to expropriate others, and shows how this process leads to corruption of some industries, but not others.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 60%
“…For example, Mara Faccio, in a series of her solo or coauthored papers, 10 defines a firm's political connection as follows: "A company is defined as being connected with a politician if at least one of its largest shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10 percent of voting shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party" (Faccio 2006, p. 369 firms are less likely to be investigated by the SEC, and even if they are investigated, the average penalty is lower for them. Other studies that adopted this definition include Roberts (1990), Kroszner and Stratmann (1998), and Ang and Boyer (2000).…”
Section: Measuring Political Connectionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We address this problem by instrumenting the measure of financial development. The instrument we use is a country's legal origin, as it is standard in the law and finance literature (La Porta et al (1997), Beck et al (2000)). Second, because of the multicollinearity induced by the "dummy problem" we can only identify relative effects.…”
Section: Winners and Losers From Financial Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%