Fictionalism in Metaphysics

Kroon, Frederick

doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00442.x

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 112 publications

(119 reference statements)

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“…Revolutionary fictionalism likewise can come in content and force forms. Revolutionary content fictionalists claim we should start literally asserting genuine beliefs in formerly real posits reformed to be real fictions, while revolutionary force fictionalists claim it would be socially useful if we starting quasi-asserting make-beliefs in the posits of a discourse also believed to not really exist in more reflective contexts (for good summaries of fictionalism, see Kroon 2011 andEklund 2017).…”

Section: Fictionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reactionary Fictionalism

Dockstader¹

2020

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Fictionalism is the view that the claims of a target discourse are best seen as being fictional in some way, as being expressed in some pretense manner, or as not being about the traditional posits of the discourse. The contemporary taxonomy of fictionalist views is quite elaborate. Yet, there is a version of fictionalism that has failed to develop and which corresponds to the earliest form of the view found in the history of philosophy, East and West. I call this view "reactionary fictionalism." I argue that traces of reactionary fictionalism can be found in Classical Daoism, Madhyamaka Buddhism, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Reactionary fictionalism is a kind of fictionalism that differs from both the hermeneutic and revolutionary kinds discussed today. Hermeneutic fictionalism says we already treat the claims of a target discourse in a fictional manner. Revolutionary fictionalism recommends we all start treating the claims of a target discourse in a fictional manner for reasons mostly of social utility. Reactionary fictionalism recommends, by contrast, that only those concerned with obtaining maximal therapeutic release from the pathology of literally asserting genuine beliefs in the claims of a target discourse should react in a pretense manner to inescapable contexts demanding the use of the claims of that discourse. I aim to show that reactionary fictionalism was a technique utilized in premodern skeptical traditions as a means for enduring one's condemnation to nearpermanent sociality. I recommend slotting reactionary fictionalism into our present taxonomy once we note that employing fictionalism can have a primarily therapeutic motivation and not merely a semantic, epistemic, or metaphysical one.

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Section: Fictionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reactionary Fictionalism

Dockstader¹

2020

The Southern J of Philosophy

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show abstract

“…Revolutionary fictionalism likewise can come in content and force forms. Revolutionary content fictionalists claim we should start literally asserting genuine beliefs in formerly real posits reformed to be real fictions, while revolutionary force fictionalists claim it would be socially useful if we starting quasi‐asserting make‐beliefs in the posits of a discourse also believed to not really exist in more reflective contexts (for good summaries of fictionalism, see Kroon 2011 and Eklund 2017).…”

Section: Fictionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reactionary Moral Fictionalism

Dockstader

2019

Philosophia

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Fictionalism is the view that the claims of a target discourse are best seen as being fictional in some way, as being expressed in some pretense manner, or as not being about the traditional posits of the discourse. The contemporary taxonomy of fictionalist views is quite elaborate. Yet, there is a version of fictionalism that has failed to develop and which corresponds to the earliest form of the view found in the history of philosophy, East and West. I call this view “reactionary fictionalism.” I argue that traces of reactionary fictionalism can be found in Classical Daoism, Madhyamaka Buddhism, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Reactionary fictionalism is a kind of fictionalism that differs from both the hermeneutic and revolutionary kinds discussed today. Hermeneutic fictionalism says we already treat the claims of a target discourse in a fictional manner. Revolutionary fictionalism recommends we all start treating the claims of a target discourse in a fictional manner for reasons mostly of social utility. Reactionary fictionalism recommends, by contrast, that only those concerned with obtaining maximal therapeutic release from the pathology of literally asserting genuine beliefs in the claims of a target discourse should react in a pretense manner to inescapable contexts demanding the use of the claims of that discourse. I aim to show that reactionary fictionalism was a technique utilized in premodern skeptical traditions as a means for enduring one's condemnation to near‐permanent sociality. I recommend slotting reactionary fictionalism into our present taxonomy once we note that employing fictionalism can have a primarily therapeutic motivation and not merely a semantic, epistemic, or metaphysical one.

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“…In taking realism about a discourse to have both semantic and metaphysical components, I am followingWright (1995),Kalderon (2005), andKroon (2011).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%