What we talk about when we talk about mental states
                           1

Drayson, Zoe

doi:10.4324/9781003091073-10

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2023

Publication Types

Select...

Book4

Other2

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent6

Authors

Journals

Cited by 13 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For examples of instrumentalist, fictionalist, and eliminativist interpretations of neural information processing, seeSprevak (2013) andDrayson (2022).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism and Instrumentalism in Bayesian Cognitive Science

Williams,

Drayson

2023

Expected Experiences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…For examples of instrumentalist, fictionalist, and eliminativist interpretations of neural information processing, seeSprevak (2013) andDrayson (2022).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism and Instrumentalism in Bayesian Cognitive Science

Williams,

Drayson

2023

Expected Experiences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mind as Metaphor

Toon

2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This book develops a new approach to the mind called mental fictionalism. The key idea behind this approach is that the mind is a useful fiction. The book begins with our ordinary conception of the mind (known as folk psychology). At present, the dominant interpretation of folk psychology sees it as an attempt to describe our inner machinery (a view the author calls Cartesianism). The representational theory of mind (or representationalism) argues that our folk theory is true, and that our thoughts (especially our propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires) are representations inside our heads. Mental fictionalism offers a new interpretation of folk psychology. According to mental fictionalism, when we attribute beliefs and desires, we do not claim that people have representations inside their heads; we merely pretend that they do. Our ordinary conception of the mind is fundamentally metaphorical: we project the ‘outer world’ of human culture (especially language) onto the ‘inner world’ of the mind. This is an enormously useful way of making sense of people and their behaviour. But we should not forget that this inner world is only a fiction.

show abstract

Copyright Page

Toon

2023

Mind as Metaphor

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What we talk about when we talk about mental states 1

Abstract: please cite published version Drayson. Z. (forthcoming) 'What we talk about when we talk about mental states' in Tamas Demeter, Ted Parent and Adam Toon (eds.), Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations. Routledge.

Cited by 13 publications

References 11 publications

Realism and Instrumentalism in Bayesian Cognitive Science

Realism and Instrumentalism in Bayesian Cognitive Science

Mind as Metaphor

Copyright Page

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About