Ferrets not infected by SARS-CoV-2 in a high-exposure domestic setting

Sawatzki, Kaitlin; Hill, Nichola J.; Puryear, Wendy B.; Foss, Alexa D.; Stone, Jonathon J.; Runstadler, Jonathan A.

doi:10.1101/2020.08.21.254995

Cited by 13 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(36 reference statements)

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“…Insofar as data limitations (e.g., limited ACE2 sequences or species trait data) preclude perfect computational predictions of zoonotic capacity, laboratory experiments are also limited in assessing true zoonotic capacity. For SARS-CoV-2 and other host-pathogen systems, animals that are readily infected in the lab appear to be less susceptible in non-lab settings (ferrets in the lab vs. mixed results in ferrets as pets (OIE, 2021;Sawatzki et al, 2020;Schlottau et al, 2020); rabbits in the lab vs. rabbits as pets (Mykytyn et al, 2021;Ruiz-Arrondo et al, 2020)). Moreover, wildlife hosts that are confirmed to shed multiple zoonotic viruses in natural settings (e.g., bats, (Peel et al, 2019)) can be much less tractable for laboratory investigations (for instance, requiring high biosecurity containment and very limited sample sizes).…”

Section: Mapping Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predicting the zoonotic capacity of mammals to transmit SARS-CoV-2

Fischhoff

Castellanos

Rodrigues

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Spillback transmission from humans to animals, and secondary spillover from animal hosts back into humans, have now been documented for SARS-CoV-2. In addition to threatening animal health, virus variants arising from novel animal hosts have the potential to undermine global COVID-19 mitigation efforts. Numerous studies have therefore investigated the zoonotic capacity of various animal species for SARS-CoV-2, including predicting both species' susceptibility to infection and their capacities for onward transmission. A major bottleneck to these studies is the limited number of sequences for ACE2, a key cellular receptor in chordates that is required for viral cell entry. Here, we combined protein structure modeling with machine learning of species' traits to predict zoonotic capacity of SARS-CoV-2 across 5,400 mammals. High accuracy model predictions were strongly corroborated by in vivo empirical studies, and identify numerous mammal species across global COVID-19 hotspots that should be prioritized for surveillance and experimental validation.

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Section: Mapping Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predicting the zoonotic capacity of mammals to transmit SARS-CoV-2

Fischhoff

Castellanos

Rodrigues

et al. 2021

Preprint

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“…Vero cells 30 , isolated from challenge studies in ferrets 31 or NHPs 32 , and is predicted to decrease furin activity 30 . The N74K residue is located in the N-terminal domain outside of the AZD1061 binding site and results in the loss of a glycan 33 .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Genetic and structural basis for recognition of SARS-CoV-2 spike protein by a two-antibody cocktail

Dong

Zost

Greaney

et al. 2021

Preprint

100

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The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has led to an urgent need to understand the molecular basis for immune recognition of SARS-CoV-2 spike (S) glycoprotein antigenic sites. To define the genetic and structural basis for SARS-CoV-2 neutralization, we determined the structures of two human monoclonal antibodies COV2-2196 and COV2-21301, which form the basis of the investigational antibody cocktail AZD7442, in complex with the receptor binding domain (RBD) of SARS-CoV-2. COV2-2196 forms an “aromatic cage” at the heavy/light chain interface using germline-encoded residues in complementarity determining regions (CDRs) 2 and 3 of the heavy chain and CDRs 1 and 3 of the light chain. These structural features explain why highly similar antibodies (public clonotypes) have been isolated from multiple individuals1–4. The structure of COV2-2130 reveals that an unusually long LCDR1 and HCDR3 make interactions with the opposite face of the RBD from that of COV2-2196. Using deep mutational scanning and neutralization escape selection experiments, we comprehensively mapped the critical residues of both antibodies and identified positions of concern for possible viral escape. Nonetheless, both COV2-2196 and COV2130 showed strong neutralizing activity against SARS-CoV-2 strain with recent variations of concern including E484K, N501Y, and D614G substitutions. These studies reveal germline-encoded antibody features enabling recognition of the RBD and demonstrate the activity of a cocktail like AZD7442 in preventing escape from emerging variant viruses.

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“…To date, there has not been a field study that documented natural infection of SARS-CoV-2 in ferrets. In one household with 29 ferrets and 2 infected humans, there was no evidence of human-to-ferret transmission based on RT-PCR and ELISA tests [ 186 ].…”

Section: Animal Host Diversity Of Sars-cov-2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Host Diversity and Potential Transmission Pathways of SARS-CoV-2 at the Human-Animal Interface

Hedman¹,

Krawczyk

Helmy

et al. 2021

Pathogens

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Emerging infectious diseases present great risks to public health. The novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), causing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), has become an urgent public health issue of global concern. It is speculated that the virus first emerged through a zoonotic spillover. Basic research studies have suggested that bats are likely the ancestral reservoir host. Nonetheless, the evolutionary history and host susceptibility of SARS-CoV-2 remains unclear as a multitude of animals has been proposed as potential intermediate or dead-end hosts. SARS-CoV-2 has been isolated from domestic animals, both companion and livestock, as well as in captive wildlife that were in close contact with human COVID-19 cases. Currently, domestic mink is the only known animal that is susceptible to a natural infection, develop severe illness, and can also transmit SARS-CoV-2 to other minks and humans. To improve foundational knowledge of SARS-CoV-2, we are conducting a synthesis review of its host diversity and transmission pathways. To mitigate this COVID-19 pandemic, we strongly advocate for a systems-oriented scientific approach that comprehensively evaluates the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 at the human and animal interface.

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Ferrets not infected by SARS-CoV-2 in a high-exposure domestic setting

Cited by 13 publications

References 32 publications

Predicting the zoonotic capacity of mammals to transmit SARS-CoV-2

Predicting the zoonotic capacity of mammals to transmit SARS-CoV-2

Genetic and structural basis for recognition of SARS-CoV-2 spike protein by a two-antibody cocktail

Host Diversity and Potential Transmission Pathways of SARS-CoV-2 at the Human-Animal Interface

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