Feeling for the Fictitious

Charlton, William

doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/24.3.206

Cited by 14 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Štoviše, jednom kada prepoznamo postojanje MPFa, imamo novi i vjerojatno bitniji poticaj na to da riješimo paradoks fikcije koji je s one strane epistemoloških briga. Istovremeno, ovo nije replikacija rješenja koja se temelje na protučinjenicama (Weston 1975;Paskins 1977;Charlton 1984Charlton , 1986McCormick 1988;usp. Yanal 1999).…”

Section: Moralna Dimenzija Paradoksa Fikcijeunclassified

Fikcijske emocije i moralna dimenzija paradoksa fikcije u filmu

Slugan

2020

Filoz. istraž. (Online)

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Nudi se dvojaka intervencija u debatu o paradoksu fikcije temeljenu na introspekciji i analitičkoj argumentaciji. Prvo, argumentira se da su se dosadašnje rasprave o paradoksu previše fokusirale na njegovu epistemološku dimenziju. To je dovelo da zanemarivanja moralne strane paradoksa, tj. malo je rečeno o tome da redovito više marimo za fikcijske entitete, nego što marimo za stvarne ljude. Drugo, predlaže se da su redovito, iako ne isključivo, strukture stvarnog života, a ne fikcijski entiteti, te koje uzrokuju emocije. U hororima, primjerice, ne bojimo se fikcijskog čudovišta, nego mogućnosti, ma koliko ona bila nevjerojatna, da nešto poput toga postoji u stvarnom svijetu. Bitno je primijetiti da se ovaj prijedlog razlikuje od pristupa temeljenih na protučinjenicama (counterfactualism) zato što dozvoljava da uzrok nekih emocija budu fikcijski entiteti. To su emocije poput simpatije i antipatije koje nemaju jasno definirane povezane tipične akcije.

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Section: Moralna Dimenzija Paradoksa Fikcijeunclassified

Fikcijske emocije i moralna dimenzija paradoksa fikcije u filmu

Slugan

2020

Filoz. istraž. (Online)

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“…It seems both artificial and unnecessary to postulate a new category, i.e., quasi-emotion, instead of accepting the much less demanding and phenomenologically more accurate option according to which beliefs, and in fact, existence beliefs, are just one kind of cognitive basis that emotions are susceptible to having. Charlton (1984) provides another attempt to challenge (a), i.e., the claim that we experience genuine emotions towards fictional objects. Unlike Walton, instead of questioning the genuine nature of the emotions, Charlton questions the claim that the particular objects of these emotions are fictional.…”

Section: Is Senior Being Sentimental?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Coleridge (1907) is often mentioned(Charlton 1984;Gendler 2013) as possibly maintaining this view.6 Cova and Teroni (2015, my translation) combine these two dimensions in the following way: ''…emotions inherit the correctness conditions of these cognitive bases and add an evaluative layer to them. In other words, if you are, say, visually aware of an event, then that experience is correct if and only if the event exemplifies the Social robots, fiction, and sentimentality…”

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confidence: 99%

Social robots, fiction, and sentimentality

Rodogno

2015

Ethics Inf Technol

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I examine the nature of human-robot pet relations that appear to involve genuine affective responses on behalf of humans towards entities, such as robot pets, that, on the face of it, do not seem to be deserving of these responses. Such relations have often been thought to involve a certain degree of sentimentality, the morality of which has in turn been the object of critical attention (Sparrow in Ethics Inf Technol 78:346-359, 2002; Blackford in Ethics Inf Technol 14:41-51, 2012). In this paper, I dispel the claim that sentimentality is involved in this type of relations. My challenge draws on literature in the philosophy of art and in cognitive science that attempts to solve the so called paradox of fictional emotions, i.e., the seemingly paradoxical way in which we respond emotionally to fictional or imaginary characters and events. If sentimentality were not at issue, neither would its immorality. For the sake of argument, however, I assume in the remaining part of the paper that sentimentality is indeed at play and bring to the fore aspects of its badness or viciousness that have not yet been discussed in connection with robot pets. I conclude that not even these aspects of sentimentality are at issue here. Yet, I argue that there are other reasons to be worried about the wide-spread use of ersatz companionship technology that have to do with the potential loss of valuable, self-defining forms of life.

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“…A different approach is that of factualism, the name sometimes applied to a school of thought that can be seen as the extreme of a continuum of opinion on the intentional objects of fiction ranging from “make‐believe” to “thought” to “reality” (Paskins 1997, McCormack 1984–85, Clark 1980, Charlton 1984, 1986). The factualist holds that the first proposition of the paradox is mistaken; when reading a novel we react not to fictions per se but to a set of circumstances and features as depicted in the narrative, which represent what we know of the real world.…”

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confidence: 99%

Fantasy, Fiction, and Feelings

Kreitman¹

2006

Metaphilosophy

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The nature of fantasy has been little discussed, despite its importance in the arts. Its significance is brought out here in relation to the long-standing debate on the alleged paradox of fictionFthat we respond emotionally to characters and events known to be unreal. Examination of the paradox shows it to be ill founded once the nature of fantasy is appreciated. Moreover, a detailed consideration of fantasy shows that it can itself provide a plausible account of our emotional reactions to creative literature, an account that, after a review of some possible objections, is then contrasted with the leading contemporary theories.

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Feeling for the Fictitious

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Fikcijske emocije i moralna dimenzija paradoksa fikcije u filmu

Fikcijske emocije i moralna dimenzija paradoksa fikcije u filmu

Social robots, fiction, and sentimentality

Fantasy, Fiction, and Feelings

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