Social robots, fiction, and sentimentality

Abstract

I examine the nature of human-robot pet relations that appear to involve genuine affective responses on behalf of humans towards entities, such as robot pets, that, on the face of it, do not seem to be deserving of these responses. Such relations have often been thought to involve a certain degree of sentimentality, the morality of which has in turn been the object of critical attention (Sparrow in Ethics Inf Technol 78:346-359, 2002; Blackford in Ethics Inf Technol 14:41-51, 2012). In this paper, I dispel the claim that sentimentality is involved in this type of relations. My challenge draws on literature in the philosophy of art and in cognitive science that attempts to solve the so called paradox of fictional emotions, i.e., the seemingly paradoxical way in which we respond emotionally to fictional or imaginary characters and events. If sentimentality were not at issue, neither would its immorality. For the sake of argument, however, I assume in the remaining part of the paper that sentimentality is indeed at play and bring to the fore aspects of its badness or viciousness that have not yet been discussed in connection with robot pets. I conclude that not even these aspects of sentimentality are at issue here. Yet, I argue that there are other reasons to be worried about the wide-spread use of ersatz companionship technology that have to do with the potential loss of valuable, self-defining forms of life.

Could Social Robots Make Us Kinder or Crueller to Humans and Animals?

“…Alternatively, as Rodogno [69] suggests, anthropomorphizing robots may be akin to our relations to characters in books, paintings, statues, and movies. For instance, we may be moved to tears by a sufering individual in a powerful movie, book, statue, or painting, and we may empathize with them, but we are (usually) under no illusion that such responses are to actual individuals who sufer or think.…”

In Love with a Corporation Without Knowing It: An Asymmetrical Relationship

“…Some have argued that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not real, while others have posited that when we feel empathy toward a character, it is actually directed at real people who would be in the same situation. Rodogno contends that the actual existence of a character is not a necessary condition for emotions to arise [11]. After all, we would not enjoy watching a movie or reading a novel if we did not care about the content on the basis that none of it is true.…”

“…In the same way as we do when we read fiction, we can experience very real emotions when interacting with machines. As Rodogno points out, although a reader would not a ttempt to comfort a fictional character, they would probably try to comfort a social robot that cries [11]. In spite of knowing that robots are machines, individuals have got emotionally attached to them.…”

“…To him, this behavior violates a rule according to which one ought to apprehend the world accurately. Rodogno, who disagrees, responds that in most cases, social robot users do not engage in sentimentality [11]. They are not deluded, he writes, and simply choose to suspend their beliefs in the same way as readers do with novels.…”

Robots are not just tools

“…For further discussion of philosophical and ethical issues around the experience of emotions towards companions robots, and their similarity to emotions felt towards fictional entities, seeRodogno (2016).…”