Federalism, Opportunism, and Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Agriculture

Ruppel, Fred J.; Boadu, Fred O.; Peterson, E. Wesley F.

doi:10.2307/1242428

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…GATT rules require federal governments to use their best efforts to ensure that their state and local governments, as well as nongovernmental and regulatory bodies (such as the EC), amend their respective regulations to conform with the provisions of the Agreement. 22 However, this requirement has proved inadequate for regulating situations such as the one described above because there is no opportunity for other states to challenge regulations that have already been approved by national legislatures prior to their publication by the EC.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Laws governing the use of technical standards as barriers to trade: The case of trade in livestock products

Kotschwar

Simon²,

Peterson

1993

Agribusiness

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This article reviews the history and current state of international law governing the application of technical standards to international trade. Conflicts surrounding the use of technical standards in livestock trade are described to illustrate some of the limitations of current GATT codes. The article includes a case study of a US firm's difficulties in exporting high‐quality beef to Europe. These illustrations provide the basis for some concluding remarks concerning possible changes in the GATT technical standards agreement that may be made as a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Laws governing the use of technical standards as barriers to trade: The case of trade in livestock products

Kotschwar

Simon²,

Peterson

1993

Agribusiness

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“…Interest group strategies, as identified by Browne (1988), were directed to facilitating both of these sets of trades. Legislators simply were engaged, with the consent of their colleagues, in legitimate political opportunism on behalf of those constituents whom they represented in a federated governing structure (Ruppel et al, 1991).…”

Section: I>istrict Testmentioning

confidence: 99%

Farmers and the U.S. Congress: rethinking basic institutional assumptions about agricultural policy

Browne

Paik

1994

Agricultural Economics

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An assumption shared by most agricultural economists is that, as farm numbers decline in a democratic government,farm policy attention from rule-makers will decline as well. This assumption -despite important work to the contrary in institutional economics -is often voiced in federated governing units, especially the U.S., where constituents arc locally organized and the commitment of rule-makers to nationwide policy is limited. While significant theoretical literature challenges that majoritarian view from the perspective of interest-group theory, this is the first empirical test and explanation of the behavior of rule-makers.The findings of this analysis indicate that classic majoritarian expectations are not met in the U.S. Congress. Instead, unexpectedly large numbers of legislators seck favorable policy action for farmers as distinct minorities within their districts. However, these same legislators balance their attention to farmers by also taking policy action in agriculture on behalf of other types of constituents. Legislators explain these actions as the result of their own electoral needs to satisfy vocal minorities from their political districts plus the case with which they can marginally adjust a large base of U.S. farm programs. Thus, a kind of nco-majoritarianism emerges.These results are especially important given the growing attention to federated governance in the European Union, East Europe, in North America through free trade agreements, and with the GATT. They indicate that farmers will continue, despite shrinking numbers, to be influential in those governing structures that have historically strong farm programs and the capacity to diversify from that policy base.

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Farmers and the U.S. Congress: rethinking basic institutional assumptions about agricultural policy

Browne

Paik

1994

Agricultural Economics

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An assumption shared by most agricultural economists is that, as farm numbers decline in a democratic government, farm policy attention from rule‐makers will decline as well. This assumption – despite important work to the contrary in institutional economics – is often voiced in federated governing units, especially the U.S., where constituents are locally organized and the commitment of rule‐makers to nationwide policy is limited. While significant theoretical literature challenges that majoritarian view from the perspective of interest‐group theory, this is the first empirical test and explanation of the behavior of rule‐makers. The findings of this analysis indicate that classic majoritarian expectations are not met in the U.S. Congress. Instead, unexpectedly large numbers of legislators seek favorable policy action for farmers as distinct minorities within their districts. However, these same legislators balance their attention to farmers by also taking policy action in agriculture on behalf of other types of constituents. Legislators explain these actions as the result of their own electoral needs to satisfy vocal minorities from their political districts plus the ease with which they can marginally adjust a large base of U.S. farm programs. Thus, a kind of neo‐majoritarianism emerges. These results are especially important given the growing attention to federated governance in the European Union, East Europe, in North America through free trade agreements, and with the GATT. They indicate that farmers will continue, despite shrinking numbers, to be influential in those governing structures that have historically strong farm programs and the capacity to diversify from that policy base.

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Federalism, Opportunism, and Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Agriculture

Cited by 3 publications

References 10 publications

Laws governing the use of technical standards as barriers to trade: The case of trade in livestock products

Laws governing the use of technical standards as barriers to trade: The case of trade in livestock products

Farmers and the U.S. Congress: rethinking basic institutional assumptions about agricultural policy

Farmers and the U.S. Congress: rethinking basic institutional assumptions about agricultural policy

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