Farmers and the U.S. Congress: rethinking basic institutional assumptions about agricultural policy

Abstract

An assumption shared by most agricultural economists is that, as farm numbers decline in a democratic government,farm policy attention from rule-makers will decline as well. This assumption -despite important work to the contrary in institutional economics -is often voiced in federated governing units, especially the U.S., where constituents arc locally organized and the commitment of rule-makers to nationwide policy is limited. While significant theoretical literature challenges that majoritarian view from the perspective of interest-group theory, this is the first empirical test and explanation of the behavior of rule-makers.The findings of this analysis indicate that classic majoritarian expectations are not met in the U.S. Congress. Instead, unexpectedly large numbers of legislators seck favorable policy action for farmers as distinct minorities within their districts. However, these same legislators balance their attention to farmers by also taking policy action in agriculture on behalf of other types of constituents. Legislators explain these actions as the result of their own electoral needs to satisfy vocal minorities from their political districts plus the case with which they can marginally adjust a large base of U.S. farm programs. Thus, a kind of nco-majoritarianism emerges.These results are especially important given the growing attention to federated governance in the European Union, East Europe, in North America through free trade agreements, and with the GATT. They indicate that farmers will continue, despite shrinking numbers, to be influential in those governing structures that have historically strong farm programs and the capacity to diversify from that policy base.

The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection

“…However, empirical findings from the United States suggest that Congress members from nonagricultural states defend the interests of vocal agricultural minorities, probably due to items such as subsidized food programs falling under USDA jurisdiction. The fact that the extent of U.S. agricultural support is much greater than industrial protection has also led some economists to question the validity of this explicitly political approach (Browne and Paik 1994). 5 Several other empirical analyses have attempted to incorporate political factors into econometric models, but in ways that are not particularly useful for the project at hand.…”

Changing Roles of Agricultural Economists and their Institutions

“…It is often alleged that production agriculture has declined in political power to the degree that (by implication) it can be ignored in any strategy or action to change the agenda of agricultural institutions and policies. This is a facile assumption about a complex matter on which there is empirical research that indicates otherwise (Browne 1988(Browne , 1992. Major reform efforts based on this assumption are likely to founder.…”

“…Critics have been given a few concessions at the margin, but these are modest and not of central concern to the primary interests of commodity groups (Browne 1988). It is pressures from growing budget deficits and GATT treaty agreements that pose the most direct threat to the scope and power of agricultural interests, not their declining numbers.…”

Texas Agricultural Organization Board Members Knowledge of and Information Sources for the 2002 Farm Bill

“…General agricultural organizations have developed communication procedures focusing on efficient economic policy, interest-group pressure, or other, often competing, sources of influences (Browne & Paik, 1994). Such procedures display the need for agricultural organization members to provide pertinent information to their leaders and lobbyists in order to achieve their objectives or shared purposes.…”