Federal Spending in Congressional Districts

Owens, John R.; Wade, Larry L.

doi:10.2307/448442

Cited by 35 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…Many analysts (e.g., Cingranelli 1983Cingranelli , 1984Dye and Hurley 1978;Gottschalk 1981;Holcombe and Zardkoohi 1981;Johnston 1978;Lowery, Brunn, and Webster 1986;Owens and Wade 1984;Ray 1980aRay , 1980bRitt 1976;Stein 1981) use total federal expenditures or total departmental expenditures as the dependent variable for analyzing the distribution of government benefits. While it may be important to get the big picture, aggregation at such a broad level most likely masks several relationships since most departments administer a number of grant programs, each with its own distributive biases.…”

Section: Pork Barrel Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants

1989

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Inderstanding the dynamics of policy distribution requires an appreciation of federal grant programs that have achieved a prominent place in nearly all areas of domestic policy. The theoretical literature on distributive politics, however, focuses almost exclusively on a centralized, top-down view of policy distribution. By examining the role of presidents, legislators, and bureaucrats, scholars have ignored participants who have become key actors in the distribution of federal expenditures-the recipient jurisdictions. This analysis of the allocation patterns under six federal programs shows that local governments exert important influences on the distribution of federal grants and that the distributional patterns and their determinants vary over time.The analysis also points out the importance of disaggregation by focusing on programs and recipient jurisdictions, as opposed to total federal expenditures and regions, states, or congressional districts.

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Section: Pork Barrel Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants

1989

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“…Such that it exists, empirical support for the relationship between congressional seniority and geographic patterns of federal allocations generally appears only as an addendum to broader studies of the relationship between committees and distributive benefits (Goss 1972;Rundquist 1973;Ferejohn 1974;Arnold 1979;Johnson 1979;Ray 1980Ray , 1982Owens and Wade 1984;Wilson 1986).…”

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confidence: 95%

A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits

Roberts¹

1990

American Journal of Political Science

408

238

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“…Additionally, Rich (1989) examined grants to only large cities and so did not examine the majority of EDA Title I grants, which were targeted at more rural areas. Regarding levels of aggregation, researchers have also examined total spending by bureaus or departments (Ritt 1976;Ray 1982;Owens and Wade 1984;Bickers 1991). Rich (1985, 38-42) provides a nice overview of the range of studies and methods.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, money corresponds more closely to actual local economic impacts (Mayer 1995). Still, the visibility and number of new projects may be more closely related to symbolic politics and congressional electoral benefits than is money (Owens and Wade 1984;Stein and Bickers 1994a). An analysis of awards in conjunction with money is possible with tobit, a statistical method appropriate for interval data that are truncated at a minimum value (e.g., $0) and for which many observations are at the minimum value.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Politics Versus Policy in Public Works Grants

Hooton

1997

American Politics Quarterly

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It is commonly accepted that members of Congress influence federal agencies informally, and that in turn the federal agencies strategically accommodate members of Congress. However, in recent years allegations of accommodation of congressional interests by federal agencies has been met with some skepticism. In this study I frame a critical test of the informal gains of U.S. House subcommittee members and leaders against that of substantive policy criteria in the awarding of distributive grants, specifically with respect to the Title I public works program of the Economic Development Administration during the period from 1978 to 1982. Utilizing a multinomial probit model of grant distributions to House members' districts, I find no substan tively strong or statistically significant "political benefits" for subcommittee members. However, subcommittee leaders are found to receive political benefits only during the critical test, and only enough to return the flow of grants to that which prevailed before the critical period.

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Federal Spending in Congressional Districts

Cited by 35 publications

References 0 publications

Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants

Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants

A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits

Politics Versus Policy in Public Works Grants

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