Federal advisory commissions in an economic model of representative democracy

A Voice without a Veto: Consensus-Building through Inclusion of Stakeholders

“…2002) implies that adding more players to a collective decision-making body makes it difficult to move away from the status quo. A broadly representative commission would then at best be a means of delaying a decision, a possibility that many commentators have raised (Stigler, 1963;McEachern, 1987). Even in a setting without veto players, social choice theory would suggest that increasing the number of members with different goals would lead to gridlock or internal conflict (Arrow, 1950(Arrow, , 1951.…”

“…3 A second and opposite possibility is that advisory commissions serve as a check on special interests. McEachern (1987) discusses this possibility and contrasts it with a deck-stacking model in the tradition of Stigler (1963). However, he finds little empirical evidence for a pure public interest explanation.…”

“…Advisory commissions have a long history of use in different time periods and under various forms of government. McEachern (1987) notes that George Washington appointed the first advisory commission in the United States (in 1794) to help determine how to address the Whiskey Rebellion. In Britain, Royal commissions of inquiry date back as far as the Domesday Book (commissioned by William the Conqueror and published in 1086), and their current form was adopted in 1517 (Clokie and Robinson, 1937;Lockwood, 1967).…”

The economic approach to political behavior: Governors, bureaucrats, and cost commissions

“…McEachern (1987) identifies four different distributions of costs and benefits (and the associated type of commission):…”

“…Type 2 and 3 commissions provide a classic mechanisms for generating political support from interest groups. McEachern (1987) argues that both types will be supported by vote maximizing legislators and will consist primarily of special interest members. Voter rational ignorance argues against the use of Type 4 commissions but governors may be able to use these commissions to tackle difficult concentrated cost policies and have the commission deflect the wrath of the special interest.…”