Fantasy Counterfactual: A Nuclear-Armed Ukraine

Rublee, Maria Rost

doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1026091

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 3 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991 after making internal plans to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited nuclear arsenals after the Soviet Union's dissolution, but they had limited physical control or access to launch codes and joined the NPT alongside repatriating the weapons to Russia (Mearsheimer 1993;Budjeryn 2015Budjeryn , 2016Rublee 2015).…”

Section: Scope Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

Herzog

2020

Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

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Horizontal nuclear proliferation presents what is sometimes referred to as the "Nth country problem," or identifying which state could be next to acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear fuel cycle technologies can contribute to both nuclear power generation and weapons development. Consequently, observers often view civilian nuclear programs with suspicion even as research on nuclear latency and the technological inputs of proliferation has added nuance to these discussions. To contribute to this debate, I put forth a simple theoretical proposition: En route to developing a civilian nuclear infrastructure and mastering the fuel cycle, states pass through a proliferation "danger zone." States with fuel cycle capabilities below a certain threshold will likely be unable to proliferate. States that pass through the "danger zone" without proliferating will be unlikely to do so in the future. I support this proposition by introducing preliminary analysis from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC) Index, a new heuristic tool to complement political assessments of the connection between civilian nuclear energy development and nuclear weapons proliferation. I conclude with policy implications for contemporary Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. Taken together, this article calls for increased policymaker interaction with historical cases and more sophisticated academic engagement with the nuclear fuel cycle.

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Section: Scope Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

Herzog

2020

Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

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“…Of course, other factors influenced Ukrainian decision-making, including American pressure and concern about the Soviet response. But both superpower responses were funneled through, and legitimized by, the nonproliferation norm codified in the NPT (Rublee, 2015). Without the NPT, there would be no universal logic of appropriateness when it comes to nuclear acquisition and possession-only logic of consequences.…”

Section: Nuclear Disarmamentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nuclear norms in global governance: A progressive research agenda

Rublee

Cohen

2018

Contemporary Security Policy

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We argue that the framework of norms has generated a progressive research agenda in the field of global nuclear politics, providing important insights that traditional realist and materialist analyses ignore or dismiss. These insights are not on the margins of nuclear politics; rather, they answer central questions about nuclear non-use, possession, and the nonproliferation regime at large. These findings are not a fluke; instead, they stem from the powerful analytical framework of norms, which provides complexes of linked propositions about actor expectations and behavior in global nuclear politics. This article examines three of those propositions: the importance of the logic of appropriateness, the role of norm contestation, and the changes brought about by norm entrepreneurs. Finally, we identify other norms-related ideas that can further illuminate the dire policy crises facing global nuclear governance, as well as specific areas of nuclear politics that would benefit from norms-related scrutiny.Contemporary global nuclear politics face serious strains and major challenges. At the heart of those challenges are contesting normative claims about the legitimate exercise of state power, the (un)importance of treaty obligations, and even what "security" and "stability" mean. Without rejecting the utility of some realist, materialist, or quantitative analyses in untangling issues related to nuclear politics, we assert-in defiance of traditional wisdom-that ideas about appropriate conduct as well as justice and fairness are central to those challenges.In this introductory article to the special issue, we argue that the use of norms in understanding global nuclear governance provides a progressive, productive, and fast-growing research agenda to understand contemporary global nuclear politics, yielding an "overarching analytical framework that

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“…South Africa's and Ukraine's disarmament, or Qaddhafi's Libya's dismantlement of their nuclear programme did not spur countries to give up their nuclear deterrent. If anything, the Qaddhafi's fate, and Ukraine's recent experience with the country's security guarantor, cast shadow over the strategic logic behind such steps (Rublee, 2015;Thakur, 2015).…”

Section: Will It Strengthen Norms?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why nuclear weapon ban treaty is unlikely to fulfil its promise

Onderčo

2017

Global Affairs

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Recent discussion about the nuclear ban treaty is the culmination of the "Humanitarian initiative", arguably the most important development within the non-proliferation regime over the past Review cycle. Supporters see such treaty as the first step to forcing countries possessing nuclear weapons to disarm. This paper argues that a ban treaty is a bad idea because it would neither strengthen the norms, nor make the world a safer place. Instead, it would weaken the position of international law, and put premium on cheating on international commitments. Such outcome would not be beneficial neither for those wishing to do away with the risk of nuclear weapons, nor for the stability of international system. The article wraps up by listing some alternative possibilities to make world safer from the nuclear weaponsshort of banning them outright.

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Fantasy Counterfactual: A Nuclear-Armed Ukraine

Cited by 8 publications

References 3 publications

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

Nuclear norms in global governance: A progressive research agenda

Why nuclear weapon ban treaty is unlikely to fulfil its promise

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