Family control, institutional environment and cash dividend policy: Evidence from China

Wei, Zhihua; Shi-nong, WU; Li, Changqing; Wei, Chen

doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2011.04.001

Cited by 64 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Recent literature recognizes that family control may bring about more effective management and supervision, and thus lead to lower owner-manager agency cost which is referred to as Agency Problem I (from the separation of ownership and management), compared to non-family firms. However, according to Wei et al (2011) expropriation and abuse of control rights exercised by family blockholders is potentially more severe and become a major agency problem which is attributed to as agency problem II (from conflicts of interest between controlling and non-controlling shareholders). Families like directors in a widely corporation may have sufficient www.ccsenet.org/ibr International Business Research Vol.…”

Section: H2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Outside Directors and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure

Marouan¹,

Guizani²

2015

IBR

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This study examines the nature and significance of the moderating effects of ownership and board leadership structure on the relationship between outside directors and firm performance. Using a sample of 42 non-financial Tunisian firms over the period 2004-2010, the results confirm the agency view of the positive relationship between board independence and performance. Similarly, in accordance with agency theory predictions, the results show that family ownership and CEO duality moderate negatively the outside directors-firm performance relationship. However, contrary to the predictions, institutional ownership moderates negatively that relationship. This can be explained by the substitution effect between corporate governance mechanisms. On the other hand, the largest shareholder ownership seems as a homologizer variable that influences the strength of the outside directors-firm performance relationship.

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Section: H2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Outside Directors and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure

Marouan¹,

Guizani²

2015

IBR

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“…p-values represent one-tailed tests of significance when an expected sign is specified, and two-tailed tests otherwise. p-values are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm Charlier and Du Boys, 2011;Gugler, 2003;Wei et al, 2011). From an SEW perspective, family firms' inclination to make payouts could be explained by their desire to provide a stable income to family members and maintain the family's reputation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In their comparisons of family and nonfamily listed firms, agency theory-based studies have reported mixed results in terms of family firm dividend payout levels. Some writers noted higher payouts (Isakov and Weisskopf, 2015;Lau and Block, 2014;Pindado et al, 2012;Setia-Atmaja et al, 2009;Setia-Atmaja, 2010;Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010), while others found the opposite (Charlier and Du Boys, 2011;Gugler, 2003;Wei et al, 2011). None of these investigations considered the effect of socioemotional wealth (SEW), a significant lever that may affect family firm payout decisions and that could shed new light on the mixed results of prior studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Payout differences between family and nonfamily listed firms: a socioemotional wealth perspective

Deslandes¹,

Fortin²,

Landry

2016

Journal of Family Business Management

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Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to explain family firm payout decisions based on socioemotional wealth (SEW) considerations. Design/methodology/approach -A sample of publicly listed Canadian companies is examined for the period from 2003 to 2008. Distinguishing family firms from nonfamily firms, a Probit regression is used to analyze the likelihood of making a payout. For payout firms, regressions are used to analyze the relationship between payout level (dividends and share repurchases) and payout mix and family firms. Findings -Results indicate that family firms are more likely to make a payout than nonfamily firms. Among payout firms, the level of payout among payout firms is lower for family firms than for nonfamily firms and their portion of payout in the form of dividends is higher. Lone founder family firms have a lower likelihood of making payouts than other family firms. However, among payout firms, they pay out more than other family firms and have a smaller percentage of their total payout in dividends than other family firms. Research limitations/implications -Results are impacted by the definition of what constitutes a family firm. Family ownership was used as a proxy for the underlying SEW considerations. Future research could involve interviews with family firm representatives to investigate the relative importance of SEW considerations in their payout decisions. Originality/value -In providing an alternative theoretical framing of family firms' payout policies, the study suggests that payout differences between family and nonfamily firms may be driven in part by SEW considerations.

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“…Dengan membagikan dividen yang tinggi berarti perusahaan keluarga tidak melakukan ekspropriasi terhadap pemegang saham minoritas. Hasil yang berbeda terdapat dalam penenlitian Wei et al (2011) yaitu perusahaan keluarga memiliki dividend payout ratio yang lebih rendah sehingga membayar dividen yang cukup kecil dibandingkan perusahaan non keluarga.…”

Section: Latar Belakang Masalahunclassified

“…Penelitian ini sejalan dengan penelitian yang dilakukan Wei et al (2011) yaitu perusahaan keluarga memiliki dividend payout ratio yang rendah dibanding perusahaan non keluarga sehingga membagikan dividen yang lebih rendah. Penelitian ini juga mendukung penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Wijayanti (2014) bahwa perusahaan yang dikontrol keluarga di Indonesia memiliki pengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap kebijakan dividen.…”

Section: Pembahasanunclassified

Analisis Perbedaan Dividen Pada Perusahaan Keluarga Dan Non Keluarga Berdasarkan Kepemilikan Ultimat

Cahyani

Sanjaya

2016

MODUS

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This study aims to to analyze whether there is a difference of the dividend shared on Latar Belakang MasalahStruktur kepemilikan dapat menyebabkan masalah keagenan yaitu tidak selarasnya tindakan yang dilakukan manajer (agen) dengan kepentingan pemegang saham (prinsipal). Pada struktur kepemilikan yang tersebar, saham perusahaan mayoritas dimiliki oleh banyak orang yang sebagian besar adalah masyarakat umum. Manajemen bertugas untuk menjalankan kegiatan perusahaan sehingga mendatangkan profit yang menguntungkan pemegang saham. Masalah keagenan terjadi ketika manajer memiliki kepentingan yang sudah tidak selaras lagi dengan pemegang saham. Manajer akan melakukan tindakan yang hanya menguntungkan pihaknya saja sehingga merugikan pemegang saham. Masalah keagenan seperti ini disebut masalah keagenan tipe 1. Sementara masalah keagenan tipe 2 yaitu masalah keagenan yang terjadi antara pemegang saham mayoritas (pemegang saham pengendali) dan pemegang saham minoritas (pemegang saham non pengendali). Masalah ini terjadi pada struktur kepemilikan yang terkonsentrasi. Masalah keagenan muncul ketika pemegang saham pengendali berusaha mendapatkan manfaat privat yang tidak menguntungkan pemegang saham non pengendali.

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Family control, institutional environment and cash dividend policy: Evidence from China

Cited by 64 publications

References 42 publications

Outside Directors and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure

Outside Directors and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure

Payout differences between family and nonfamily listed firms: a socioemotional wealth perspective

Analisis Perbedaan Dividen Pada Perusahaan Keluarga Dan Non Keluarga Berdasarkan Kepemilikan Ultimat

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