False data injection attacks with incomplete information against smart power grids

Rahman, Mohammad Azizur; Mohsenian‐Rad, Hamed

doi:10.1109/glocom.2012.6503599

Cited by 265 publications

(143 citation statements)

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“…Rather than assuming that an adversary possesses complete knowledge on the power grid topology and transmission line admittances [32,55], Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad [58] investigated a more practical scenario in which the attack has limited information with respect to the power network topology or admittance for some transmission lines. They disclosed that it is possible to compromise state estimation with only incomplete information against smart power grids.…”

Section: Resolving Data Integrity Violation In State Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They disclosed that it is possible to compromise state estimation with only incomplete information against smart power grids. A more realistic FDI attack was introduced in [58], where various grid parameters and attributes such as the position of circuit breaker switches and transformer tap changers are unknown to the potential adversaries, and the adversaries also have limited access to most of the grid facilities. Covertly compromising the readings of multiple power grid sensors and PMUs in order to mislead the operation and control centres was identified as the major threat against smart power grids in [58], though adversaries only have incomplete information.…”

Section: Resolving Data Integrity Violation In State Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A more realistic FDI attack was introduced in [58], where various grid parameters and attributes such as the position of circuit breaker switches and transformer tap changers are unknown to the potential adversaries, and the adversaries also have limited access to most of the grid facilities. Covertly compromising the readings of multiple power grid sensors and PMUs in order to mislead the operation and control centres was identified as the major threat against smart power grids in [58], though adversaries only have incomplete information. Moreover, two types of FDI attack were introduced in [58], which are perfect attacks (the attacker has complete knowledge of the admittance for all lines on at least one cut on the grid topology) and imperfect attacks (the above information is not available).…”

Section: Resolving Data Integrity Violation In State Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security Challenges in Smart Grid Implementation

Goel

Yuan

2015

SpringerBriefs in Cybersecurity

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The smart grid architecture amalgamates the physical power grid and a communication grid into a single monolithic network. It poses several security threats that are well known (Li et al. in IEEE Trans Smart Grid 3:1540-1551 [1], McDaniel and McLaughlin in IEEE Secur Priv 7:75, 77, 2009 [2], Bisoi and Dash 2011 [3]). However, it faces unknown threats from the cyber-physical interfaces whereby either cyber-threats can lead to actuation of physical devices or vice versa if physical devices could be manipulated to disrupt the communication infrastructure. The most prevalent threats to the operation and safety of the smart grid come from physical destruction of infrastructure, data poisoning, denial of services, malware, and intrusion. The most prevalent threat to the consumer is breach of privacy of the data and malicious control of personal devices and appliances. This chapter articulates the smart grid architecture and the cyberphysical threats to which the smart grid is vulnerable. Smart Grid Architecture IntroductionThe smart grid is a traditional power grid with a communication network overlaid on top of the traditional power grid. The communication and power grid are interrelated such that the communication network depends on the power grid for data and the power grid depends on the communication for operational activities. The role of the grid is to provide ubiquitous communication capability for collecting data from sensors and meters, process it in situ, and provide pertinent information to support multiple activities such as ensuring grid stability, detecting and resolving anomalies, forecasting load, and facilitating demand response. All this needs to be done while protecting the privacy of the consumers, protecting critical operational data that from national adversaries, and ensuring the integrity of the data for both business and operational needs. This is not a trivial challenge for several reasons, including need to integrate disparate communication media into a single monolithic network, need to provide guaranteed latency and bandwidth for several applications, and need to ensure privacy and security of the data as necessary.The power grid is typically segregated into transmission, distribution, and the last mile. Transmission carries high-voltage current over long distances to substations. Distribution carries lower-voltage data from substations to local transformers. The last mile connects the local transformers to consumers, and it is where utilities and consumers interact to support real-time management of energy generation, distribution, usage, and efficiency. With the integration of the smart grid technologies, the traditional network is now entering households and businesses. Parallel to the power grid, the communication grid can be segregated into wide area network (WAN), metropolitan area network (MAN), field area network (FAN), and home area network (HAN) as shown in Fig. 1.1.The primary goal associated with the transmission network is to provide situational awareness where techn...

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Section: Resolving Data Integrity Violation In State Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resolving Data Integrity Violation In State Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resolving Data Integrity Violation In State Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security Challenges in Smart Grid Implementation

Goel

Yuan

2015

SpringerBriefs in Cybersecurity

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“…Despite the fact that many attacks could affect the entities mentioned above, almost none of them can have comparable impact to a false data injection attack [37][38]. That is, an attack where adversaries manipulate measurements of field devices and metering devices in the Smart Grid network, introducing errors to those measurements destined for the head-end.…”

Section: ) Sg_4 : Attacks Against Wide Area Measurement Equipmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Survey in Smart Grid and Smart Home Security: Issues, Challenges and Countermeasures

Komninos

Philippou²,

Pitsillides³

2014

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

492

248

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This is the unspecified version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link:http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/3734/ Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ COMST.2014.2320093 Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ publications@city.ac.ukCity Research Online  Abstract-The electricity industry is now at the verge of a new era. An era that promises, through the evolution of the existing electrical grids to Smart Grids, more efficient and effective power management, better reliability, reduced production costs and more environmentally friendly energy generation. Numerous initiatives across the globe, led by both industry and academia, reflect the mounting interest around the enormous benefits but also the great risks introduced by this evolution. This paper focuses on issues related to the security of the Smart Grid and the Smart Home, which we present as an integral part of the Smart Grid. Based on several scenarios we aim to present some of the most representative threats to the Smart Home / Smart Grid environment. The threats detected are categorized according to specific security goals set for the Smart Home/Smart Grid environment and their impact on the overall system security is evaluated. A review of contemporary literature is then conducted with the aim of presenting promising security countermeasures with respect to the identified specific security goals for each presented scenario. An effort to shed light on open issues and future research directions concludes the paper. Index Terms-Smart Grids, Smart Homes, Security, Countermeasures, Challenges I. INTRODUCTIONThe electric power infrastructure as we know it today has managed to serve our needs successfully, almost unchanged, for nearly a century; revolutionizing almost every aspect of our lives. However, as this infrastructure is inevitably aging it becomes increasingly less efficient, repeatedly running up against its limitations and constantly straining to keep up with our ever-increasing requirements. Needs for reliability, scalability, manageability, environmentally friendly energy generation, interoperability and cost effectiveness, bring forward the necessity for a modernized and intelligent grid for tomorrow; a new, reliable, efficient, flexible and secure energy infrastructure, known as the Smart Grid [1].Through the incorporation of advanced power system electronics, networking and communication technologies the Smart Grid is envisioned to significantly enhance the existing electric grid. Allowing for more accurate real-time monitoring, ensuring the optimization of power flows and enabling for two-way communication between the utility and customer sides while pointing th...

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“…Furthermore, these approaches only considered that the attacker has complete knowledge of power system. According to a recent research of Rahman et al [13] and Liu et al [14], the attacker's knowledge may be limited.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protection Strategies Against False Data Injection Attacks with Uncertain Information on Electric Power Grids

Bae¹,

Lee²,

Kim³

et al. 2017

Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology

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-False data injection attacks have recently been introduced as one of important issues related to cyber-attacks on electric power grids. These attacks aim to compromise the readings of multiple power meters in order to mislead the operation and control centers. Recent studies have shown that if a malicious attacker has complete knowledge of the power grid topology and branch admittances, s/he can adjust the false data injection attack such that the attack remains undetected and successfully passes the bad data detection tests that are used in power system state estimation. In this paper, we investigate that a practical false data injection attack is essentially a cyber-attack with uncertain information due to the attackers lack of knowledge with respect to the power grid parameters because the attacker has limited physical access to electric facilities and limited resources to compromise meters. We mathematically formulated a method of identifying the most vulnerable locations to false data injection attack. Furthermore, we suggest minimum topology changes or phasor measurement units (PMUs) installation in the given power grids for mitigating such attacks and indicate a new security metrics that can compare different power grid topologies. The proposed metrics for performance is verified in standard IEEE 30-bus system. We show that the robustness of grids can be improved dramatically with minimum topology changes and low cost.

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False data injection attacks with incomplete information against smart power grids

Cited by 265 publications

References 9 publications

Security Challenges in Smart Grid Implementation

Security Challenges in Smart Grid Implementation

Survey in Smart Grid and Smart Home Security: Issues, Challenges and Countermeasures

Protection Strategies Against False Data Injection Attacks with Uncertain Information on Electric Power Grids

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