2017
DOI: 10.1109/tsg.2016.2521178
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False Data Attacks Against AC State Estimation With Incomplete Network Information

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Cited by 210 publications
(104 citation statements)
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“…In this section, the proposed approach is applied and investigated on the IEEE 14-bus test grid. This test grid is often used in the context of FDI attack detection [27], [29], [30] and attack construction [35], [38]. The voltage angles and magnitudes of this grid are calculated from the AC power flow solver implemented by the pandapower-tool [55].…”
Section: Case Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In this section, the proposed approach is applied and investigated on the IEEE 14-bus test grid. This test grid is often used in the context of FDI attack detection [27], [29], [30] and attack construction [35], [38]. The voltage angles and magnitudes of this grid are calculated from the AC power flow solver implemented by the pandapower-tool [55].…”
Section: Case Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, several contributions that show how an attacker could construct undetectable attacks based on the AC model do exist (see, e.g. [11], [27], [37], [38]).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consequently, the FDI attack is successfully applied to the measurement vector when the attack is modelled as a Hc  . In this case, the measurement vector under the attack has a larger deviation from the true vector, which will undermine the safe and stable operation of generators [28].…”
Section: Generator Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, a numerous attacks of different categories such as Denial of Service (DoS) may perpetrate entire grid or any specific point of its components to disrupt grid main functions and make the service unstable or unavailable . False data injection attacks lead to compromise the data integrity between grid components . Additionally, existing vulnerabilities in smart grid devices may allow attackers to access the network, break the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…15 False data injection attacks lead to compromise the data integrity between grid components. 16 Additionally, existing vulnerabilities in smart grid devices may allow attackers to access the network, break the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data. Among these types of threats in smart grid, DoS is a typical attack that severely threatens the availability of interconnected grid components and disrupts a crucial service to millions of citizens.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%