“…A latest example is Zhou, Tao, Zhang, and Cai (2016) who study a hybrid mechanism that combines a uniform-price reverse auction with flexible noncompetitive contracts; their mechanism awards multiple winners because each supplier only provides one unit, which is quite different from our dual-sourcing model where each supplier can provide multiple units and the buyer allocates quantities endogenously to mitigate supply risk. In fact, there are other operational reasons for splitting awards in reverse auctions, including suppliers' convex production costs (e.g., Tunca & Wu, 2009), capacity constraints (e.g., Chaturvedi, 2015), supplier retention (e.g., Chaturvedi, Beil, & Martínez-de-Albéniz, 2014), reducing external failure costs caused by defective products (e.g., Yim, 2014), or other given policies (e.g., Gupta, Chen, Dawande, & Janakiraman, 2015). Our study differs from the above papers in that the characteristic of dual-sourcing auction design is supply risk mitigation.…”