Factor Endowments: Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States

Engerman, Stanley L.; Sokoloff, Kenneth L.

doi:10.3386/h0066

Cited by 549 publications

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“…In addition to greatly enhancing our historical knowledge about how and why New Spain's institutions took the form they did, this new literature is beginning to frame the question of Mexico's «colonial heritage» in operationalizable and testable ways. " Engerman and Sokoloff (1997). One should note here that Sokoloíf and Engerman are directly disputing one of Coatsworth's main assertions: that the unequal structure of land tenure in New Spain did not directly effect the colony's ability to grow after independence.…”

Section: Institutional Choicementioning

confidence: 88%

Progress without order: mexican economic history in the 1990s

Maurer

1999

RHE / JILAEH

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Este artículo revisa el desaroUo más reciente en el campo de la historia económica mexicana. Argumenta que en los últimos diez años ha ocurrido un cambio significativo en la metodología, se ha pasado de la teoría de la dependencia y el análisis institucional tradicional, hacia el uso extensivo de técnicas cliométricas e hipótesis tomadas de la Nueva Economía Institucional. Este cambio ha aumentado nuestro conocimiento de diversas claves de la historia económica de México. Ciertamente el área ha experimentado un progreso importante, pero todavía falta un cierto ordenamiento. ABSTRACTThis article surveys the most recent developments in the fíeld of Mexican economic history.It argües that the last ten years has seen a signifícant shift in the methodoiogy and focus of the fíeld, away from dependency and traditional institutional analysis, and towards the extensive use of cliometric techniques and hypotheses drawn from the New Institutional Economics. This shift has greatly increased our understanding of several key issues in Mexico's economic history, but much of the work done to date has lacked a coherent focus on a specific set of issues. In other words, the fíeld has recently made astounding progress, but still lacks sufficient order.Unlike their counterparts in many other countries, Mexican historians have always concemed themselves with questions about long-term eco-

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Section: Institutional Choicementioning

confidence: 88%

Progress without order: mexican economic history in the 1990s

Maurer

1999

RHE / JILAEH

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“…The third contender, geography, is usually considered as the rival contender to institutions in the debate over what is the 'deep' determinant of development as measured by income per capita (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997;Acemoglu et al 2001;Sachs, 2003;Easterly and Levine, 2003;Rodrik et al 2004;Cartensen and Gundlach, 2006). Since one of the principal ways geography is argued to affect income is through health (Bloom and Sachs, 1998;Sachs 2001;Sachs, 2003;Cartensen and Gundlach, 2006), it seems natural to consider geography as a contender on its own in investigating explanations for differences in mortality as well.…”

Section: B the Contendersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wealthiest Is Not Always Healthiest: What Explains Differences in Child Mortality in West Africa?

Ickowitz

2011

Journal of African Economies

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Abstract. Ghana has the lowest under-five mortality rate in West Africa. Understanding why Ghana's child mortality rate is lower than in neighboring countries may offer useful insights for other developing countries that are trying to improve child health. This paper explores whether Ghana's lower mortality rate is mostly a result of greater household wealth, better implementation of national health policies, or more favorable geography. The paper uses micro level data for children under five to examine relative child mortality risk between Ghana and each of its three immediate neighbors --Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo. A Cox proportional hazards model is used to test which of the three 'contenders' -health policy, wealth, or geography -best explains Ghana's mortality advantage. The results of the analysis indicate that wealth variables are not able to explain any of the child mortality variation between Ghana and its neighbors. Geography and health policy variables each explain about 40% of the mortality gap between Ghana and Burkina Faso. Health policy differences alone are able to explain about 70% of the child mortality gap between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. These results suggest that even poor countries that have been 'cursed' by bad geography can potentially improve development outcomes and save children's lives.

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“…Easterly (2001) tests this link first proposed by Engerman andSokoloff (1997, 2001) by showing that tropical endowment leads to a higher propensity of commodity production, which in turn is associated with higher inequality. 41 Applying this strategy to cross-country data for the 1990s, The taxonomy of democratic transitions relates to inequality in resource endowments and consequently inequality in disposable incomes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Naive regressions using cross-sectional data correspond well to the theoretical predictions. To address potential problems of endogeneity, we also apply an instrumentation strategy based on the argument by Engerman andSokoloff (1997, 2001) along the lines of Easterly (2001) and use measures of initial inequality and exogenous geographical characteristics to instrument inequality. The empirical results broadly support the theoretical predictions.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…37 In the empirical analysis we use Easterly's (2001) middle class income share, measured by the relative size of the three middle income quintiles averaged over the years 1960-1996, as measure of equality. Invoking the argument by Engerman andSokoloff (1997, 2001) and Easterly (2001) However, these results may suffer from a severe endogeneity problem if institutions affect inequality, or if other variables that are not contained in the specification are correlated both with inequality and institutional quality. In light of our theory, a primary candidate for this is the existence of a democracy.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Consensual and Conflictual Democratization

Cervellati¹,

Fortunato²,

Sunde

2012

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Consensual and Conflictual DemocratizationMatteo Cervellati Piergiuseppe Fortunato Uwe Sunde D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S ABSTRACT Consensual and Conflictual Democratization *We study the process of endogenous democratization from inefficient oligarchic systems in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. The features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. The political regime and the extent of redistribution implemented under it depend on the allocation of de facto political power across the different social groups. The cost of public enforcement of property rights depends on the extent of predation activities in the economy. The theory highlights the importance of inequality in natural resources and availability of human capital for endogenous democratic transitions. Multiple politico-economic equilibria can be sustained conditional on expectations about property rights enforcement. This generates history dependence. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed in conflictual environments. We test the novel predictions using available cross-country data. The link between the type of democratic transition and the outcomes under democracy is also investigated using novel data on constitutional principles. The findings support the theoretical predictions.JEL Classification: H10, O20, N10

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Factor Endowments: Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States

Cited by 549 publications

References 0 publications

Progress without order: mexican economic history in the 1990s

Progress without order: mexican economic history in the 1990s

Wealthiest Is Not Always Healthiest: What Explains Differences in Child Mortality in West Africa?

Consensual and Conflictual Democratization

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