Facilitating developments of solar thermal power and nuclear power generations for carbon neutral: A study based on evolutionary game theoretic method

Wang, Gang; Chao, Yuechao; Jiang, Tieliu; Chen, Zeshao

doi:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.151927

Cited by 47 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…The evolutionary time (i.e., x-axis) stands for the normalized development time after a certain evolution mode begins. It is a normalized time parameter with no unit [ 40 ].…”

Section: Simulation Analysis Of Main Influencing Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Effectively Reduce Honey Adulteration in China: An Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Zhang

Wang

et al. 2023

Foods

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Apiculture has been greatly developed in recent years in China. Beekeeping cooperatives and honey manufacturing enterprises have increased rapidly. As a result, a variety of honey products have entered the market, adding vitality to the food economy; however, the adulteration of honey products is on the rise in China. Previous attempts to control the adulteration of honey products mostly relied on technical, product-specific measures, and there was a lack of modeling research to guide the supervision of the honey product industry. In order to help local governments to better control the adulteration of honey products from a management perspective, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model composed of beekeeping cooperatives, honey product enterprises, and local governments. Through stability analysis and model simulation, we found that local government subsidies to cooperatives have little impact on the game system. Local government penalties to cooperatives and price adjustments of unadulterated raw honey by cooperatives are effective management tools to reduce the adulteration behavior of cooperatives. Local government penalties for enterprises are an effective management tool to reduce the adulteration behavior of enterprises. This research provides useful information for government agencies to design appropriate policies/business modes so as to promote sustainability and the healthy development of the honey product industry in China.

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“…The evolutionary time (i.e., x-axis) stands for the normalized development time after a certain evolution mode begins. It is a normalized time parameter with no unit [ 40 ].…”

Section: Simulation Analysis Of Main Influencing Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Effectively Reduce Honey Adulteration in China: An Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Zhang

Wang

et al. 2023

Foods

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“…In comparison, it can play a positive role in correction, which is a kind of top-down communication [25]. At the same time, smart community should also make clear the dissatisfaction and desire of smart community residents to demand, provide more efcient institutional services, and seek their own development with a bottom-up feedback mechanism [26]. Terefore, in the regulatory game, if smart communities shift their focus to their own operations, they will naturally not pay additional rent-seeking costs to cope with supervision, nor will they bear the serious punishment that may result from evading supervision.…”

Section: Strategies For Institutional Behavior Improvement Formentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the Game Behavior of Smart Community Regulatory Participants to Co-Create the Smart City: Post-Human Stakeholder Perspectives

Wan

Yin

2023

Health & Social Care in the Community

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The sustainable development of smart community is the key to China’s grassroots governance and also the general trend of China’s urban modernization. In the supervision of the smart community, the optimization of the behavior of the regulatory subject cannot be separated. Previous studies have focused more on how subjects participate in supervision and less on the behavior of stakeholders in the game. This paper analyzes the game behavior of regulatory participants in the process of sustainable development of smart community and studies the optimization strategy of regulatory behavior according to the game behavior logic among participants. The results show the following. (i) Government behavior plays a leading role in supervision. (ii) When the government invests resources in the screening of third-party evaluation agencies and service purchase and mainly adopts policy punishment methods for stakeholders with rent-seeking behavior, the probability of regulatory participation stakeholders’ positive behavior is the greatest. (iii) The improvements should be made from the aspects of information network construction, the refinement of reward and punishment measures, and the improvement of evaluation party access rules. This not only helps to enhance the good supervision situation of the supervision enthusiasm of the participants but also can realize the self-discipline operation of the smart community and enhance the responsibility consciousness of the evaluation institutions.

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“…For public-private partnership (PPP) projects in wastewater treatment, Estalaki et al (2015) and Lv et al (2021) constructed different evolutionary game models to analyze the dynamic game of stakeholders. Wang et al (2021) discussed how energy investment companies promote the development of solar thermal power and nuclear power in the context of carbon neutrality. An evolutionary game model was constructed to analyze the cooperative game among energy investment companies, solar thermal power plants and nuclear power plants.…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary analysis of Japan's nuclear wastewater discharge events considering the impact of participants' emotions

Xin

Liu

Wang

et al. 2022

Ocean & Coastal Management

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Facilitating developments of solar thermal power and nuclear power generations for carbon neutral: A study based on evolutionary game theoretic method

Cited by 47 publications

References 31 publications

How to Effectively Reduce Honey Adulteration in China: An Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

How to Effectively Reduce Honey Adulteration in China: An Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Analysis of the Game Behavior of Smart Community Regulatory Participants to Co-Create the Smart City: Post-Human Stakeholder Perspectives

Evolutionary analysis of Japan's nuclear wastewater discharge events considering the impact of participants' emotions

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