Face-to-face lying – An experimental study in Sweden and Japan

Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information

“…However, as we found no significant difference between lottery and ordinary payment conditions, we used the ordinary payment method in the rest of the session to simplify the instructions. Differences in experimental procedures between sessions are discussed in our previous paper (Kawagoe and Takizawa, 1999). Those interested in the details may want to consult that paper.…”

“…However, it is convenient to use X, Y , and Z as indicated in the text when we need to classify the play of receivers. 5 See Kawagoe and Takizawa (1999) for detailed information on sequential equilibria of these games including mixed strategies. specifically, the payoff for sender type t from action a is −[a − (t − d)] 2 and the receiver's payoff is −(a − t) 2 , where the alignment of preferences is measured by parameter d. In our games, parameter d is type dependent as in Blume et al (2001).…”

“…Burgoon et al (1994) show that for novices as well as experts, such as military intelligence instructors, the accuracy rate of detection is much higher for truthful messages than for deceptive ones. This is called "truth-detection bias," a well-known but still disputable phenomenon (Vrij, 2000;Holm, 2004;and Holm and Kawagoe, 2008).…”

Let’s be honest: A review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling

“…Experimental evidence suggests that subjectś propensity to transmit false messages may be related to gender (Dreber & Johanneson, 2008 -while this is contested by Gylfason, Arnardottir, & Kristinsson, 2013), subject major (Childs, 2012), religiousness (Childs, 2012), stake size (Dreber & Johanneson, 2008), the magnitude of the lie and accompanying promises (Lundquist et al, 2009), and the time of day (Kouchaki & Smith, 2014). Other scholars have found that mendacious behavior is positively correlated with local corruption levels (Innes & Mitra, 2013) and in group settings (Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, & Murnighan, 2009), and negatively related to situations where the sender and receiver can see each other face-to-face (Holm & Kawagoe, 2010;Van Zant & Kray, 2014) or where the lie is accompanied by a personalized message (Cappelen et al, 2013). Face-to-face interaction promotes honesty Key: Type: F = Field, L = Lab; Areas: E = Economics, P = Psychology; a Results included in Table 8.…”

Honesty, beliefs about honesty, and economic growth in 15 countries

“…Croson and Buchan 1999;Henrich 2004;Henrich et al 2006;Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter 2008), some existing papers have compared honesty across countries. Holm and Kawagoe (2010) run a sender-receiver game in Sweden and Japan, finding no differences in average levels of truth-telling. Pascual-Ezama et al (2015) report an experiment among university students in 16 countries.…”