Purpose -This article aims to explore how knowledge-intensive service firms design inter-firm contracts to govern the exchange of highly intangible and inseparable knowledge under varying degrees of property right protection. Design/methodology/approach -This research uses a multiple case study of management consulting firms domiciled in Serbia and Albania. Findings -Firms domiciled in relatively weak property right settings prefer more informal contracts, whereas those in settings of superior property right protection favour greater formality as a means of encouraging the creation and sharing of knowledge, whilst concurrently mitigating the threat of opportunism.Research limitations/implications -This article contributes new knowledge with regard to the design of inter-firm contracts to govern the sharing of highly intangible and inseparable knowledge. In terms of theory, it employs a transaction cost economics approach in which inter-firm contracts are decomposed into five requisite provisions, which are then related to the degree of formality. Practical implications -Knowledge-intensive service firm managers should assess the degree of property right protection when considering the degree of formality of inter-firm contracts. Originality/value -The study constitutes the first attempt to empirically examine how knowledge-intensive service firms craft contracts in different property right settings. With the burgeoning number of cross-border collaborative partnerships between such firms, it offers important insights into the choice of governance mechanism in different property right protection settings.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of income inequality on cooperative propensities, and thus the ability of individuals to resolve collective action dilemmas.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper presents a meta-study of 32 developing country lab experiments correlating cooperative behaviour with prevailing Gini coefficients. Furthermore, the paper conducts standard dictator- and public goods game (PGG) experiments with culturally and demographically similar subject pools in two West African countries characterized by high and persistent variation in national income inequality.
Findings
The meta-study findings of a significant negative relationship between income inequality and contribution levels in the PGG are corroborated by the own laboratory experimental findings that participants in more unequal Nigeria are significantly less altruistic and exhibit significantly lower propensities to cooperate than their more egalitarian Ghanaian counterparts. Moreover, the latter findings are robust when controlling for personal income levels.
Practical implications
The findings have nontrivial implications for collective action theorists and practitioners seeking to elicit tacit cooperation in developing countries.
Originality/value
The major contributions of this paper are the novel meta-analysis and the first attempt to examine the influence of personal income levels on cooperative behaviour in societies characterized by differential levels of income inequality.
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