FABRICATION OF $sup 252$Cf NEUTRON SOURCES AT OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY.

Cleve, J.E. Van; Williams, L.C.; Knauer, J.B.; Bigelow, J.E.; Gage, S.J.

doi:10.2172/4695421

Cited by 2 publications

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“…36 Still, one might object that when we conceive of a world that lacks material objects, we do not actually see that such a world is possible, or even that it is likely to be possible; rather, we merely fail to see that it is impossible. 37 A different strategy is to suggest that the exact nature and quantity of fundamental particles (e.g., quarks or superstrings) in our universe seems to be a contingent matter. 38 According to this suggestion, it is self-evident that there could have been one fewer fundamental particle than there actually are.…”

Section: Immaterialitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Cosmological Arguments from Contingency

Rasmussen

2010

Philosophy Compass

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Cosmological arguments from contingency attempt to show that there is a necessarily existing god‐like being on the basis of the fact that any concrete things exist at all. Such arguments are built out of the following components: (i) a causal principle that applies to non‐necessary entities of a certain category; (ii) a reason to think that if the causal principle is true, then there would have to be a necessarily existing concrete thing; (iii) a reason to think that the necessarily existing thing would be god‐like. In this essay, I discuss various ways of developing each of these components to produce an argument from contingency, and I point out classic objections and replies along the way. I also make note of some of the most recent developments in arguments from contingency and point out avenues for future research.

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Section: Immaterialitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Cosmological Arguments from Contingency

Rasmussen

2010

Philosophy Compass

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“…Furthermore, there is no one-to-one isomorphism between phenomenal object or appearance and thing in itself, which is not to say that there are not any isomorphisms between the phenomenal and the noumenal. 9 The 'object' (in the general sense) is either an appearance as an empirically real object (in Kant's sense) or a thing in itself that is transcendentally real, whereby the empirically real object is, in some sense, a limitation of the transcendentally real 'thing', of reality tout court. Note that by reality tout court I do not mean empirical or physical reality.…”

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confidence: 99%

Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism

Schulting

2017

Kant's Radical Subjectivism

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Kant grants that by means of the pure concepts in abstraction from sensible intuition we can and indeed must still think things in themselves as the ground of the appearances that we cognise as the empirically real objects of experience (cf. A96; Bxxvi; A143/B182). But what exactly do we think, in thinking things in themselves? This is an important question to ask in the context of Kant's subjectivism, since many commentators take Kant's idealism to argue that objects are only ideal in regard to how they appear to us as spatiotemporal objects (appearances), but not insofar as they are also things in themselves. If we abstract from what constitutes the spatiotemporality of objects, we can thus perfectly well conceive of their intrinsic nature, implying that Kant's subjectivism does not affect the way we think about things in themselves, in abstraction from the properties that conform to our subjective conditions of knowledge (space and time). Or so these readers argue. This would mean that we can be metaphysical realists of sorts about things in themselves, as indeed Hegel thinks we must (see Chap. 8), and thus that the categories are not limited to application to 9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism

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FABRICATION OF $sup 252$Cf NEUTRON SOURCES AT OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY.

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Cited by 2 publications

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Cosmological Arguments from Contingency

Cosmological Arguments from Contingency

Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism

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