Cosmological Arguments from Contingency

Abstract

Cosmological arguments from contingency attempt to show that there is a necessarily existing god‐like being on the basis of the fact that any concrete things exist at all. Such arguments are built out of the following components: (i) a causal principle that applies to non‐necessary entities of a certain category; (ii) a reason to think that if the causal principle is true, then there would have to be a necessarily existing concrete thing; (iii) a reason to think that the necessarily existing thing would be god‐like. In this essay, I discuss various ways of developing each of these components to produce an argument from contingency, and I point out classic objections and replies along the way. I also make note of some of the most recent developments in arguments from contingency and point out avenues for future research.

Divine necessity

“…See also Pruss and Rasmussen (forthcoming) for a clear‐headed overview and discussion of various arguments for there being at least one necessarily existing concrete object. But note that it is an open question how to get from there to any of the two theses of divine necessity discussed in the present paper; though see Rasmussen (, section 5) for some hints. See also Oppy (: ch.6).…”

“…Arguably, Rasmussen () puts too much emphasis on causality, though it is not clear to me what he means by “causal.” He does seem to use the term very broadly. For overview, discussion, and references on a non‐causal notion of grounding, see Bliss and Trogdon () and Raven ().…”

Divine Foundationalism

“…Note that, though related, cosmological arguments for a first cause or a necessary ground are not what we are looking for with respect to DF S ; on cosmological arguments, see e.g. Craig (), Alexander (), Rasmussen () and Pruss (). See also Pearce () for an articulation and defense of the coherence of a version of DF S .…”

“…For present purposes, the question would then be whether God is needed down at the bottom level in order for there to be consciousness and normativity there. See also Rasmussen (Rasmussen, : section 5).…”