Extended benefits and the duration of UI spells: evidence from the New Jersey extended benefit program

Card, David; Levine, Phillip B.

doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00113-9

Cited by 282 publications

(237 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…However, it is interesting to note that the predicted fall in average unemployment duration associated with a reduction in the length of the UI period through the imposition of a soft constraint is sizeable, i.e., around half a day for every week's reduction. This effect is of the same magnitude as that reported by Card and Levine (2000) on the basis of an extended benefit program in New Jersey, USA. This similarity is intriguing, given that for most job-seekers, the soft constraint imposed in Norway does not really affect the absolute duration limit of UI benefits at all; it only reduces the time until some form of activity is demanded.…”

Section: Activation In Unemployment Insurancesupporting

confidence: 80%

Active social insurance

Røed¹

2012

IZA J Labor Policy

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The paper argues that a comprehensive activation strategy is called for -in both unemployment and disability insurance -to minimize the conflict between income insurance and work incentives and to prevent the economic crisis from causing a long-lasting decline in labor force participation. A review of recent empirical evidence, particularly from the Scandinavian countries, indicates that "mild" activation requirements effectively counteract moral hazard problems in social insurance. The paper also argues that the distinction between unemployment and disability is blurred, and that both temporary and permanent disability insurance programs should be designed to encourage and support the use of remaining (partial) work capacity.

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Section: Activation In Unemployment Insurancesupporting

confidence: 80%

Active social insurance

Røed¹

2012

IZA J Labor Policy

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“…However, an enduring concern has been endogenous policy bias, as will arise when more generous UI rules are introduced in anticipation of a deteriorating labor market. More recent studies therefore have either sought to identify legal changes in benefit duration that occur independently of labor market conditions (Card and Levine, 2000;Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004) or to exploit changes in the law that affect several categories of (treated) unemployed workers differently (with no change in benefits for another group of controls) for a reasonably long panel of data (Lalive, van Ours, Zweimüller, 2006;van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006). The results are again consistent with (job search) theory and are economically and statistically significant particularly for benefit duration where stronger disincentive effects are observed.…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

How do different entitlements to unemployment benefits affect the transitions from unemployment into employment?

Addison

Portugal

2008

Economics Letters

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“…The evidence on this point is mixed. While US and UK studies typically provide benefit elasticity estimates (the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the level of the unemployment benefit) ranging from 0.2 to 0.9 (Moffitt, 1985;Narendranathan et al, 1985;Katz and Meyer, 1990;Meyer, 1990;Card and Levine, 1998), European elasticity estimates differ widely, from virtually zero (Hujer and Schneider, 1989;Groot, 1990;van den Berg, 1990;Steiner, 1990;Hernaes and Strøm, 1996) to above unity (Abbring et al, 1998;Carling et al (1999).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Temporary layoffs and the duration of unemployment

Røed¹,

Nordberg²

2003

Labour Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe use Norwegian micro-data to identify the driving forces behind unemployment spells following temporary-and permanent dismissals. The duration of unemployment spells for permanently dismissed workers is primarily explained by individual resources and economic incentives, while spell-duration for temporary dismissed workers is explained by firm incentives. Higher benefits reduce the employment hazard for permanently-but i ncrease it for temporary dismissed workers. Structural duration dependence is nonparametrically identified and sharply estimated with the aid of lagged hazard rate variation and repeated spells. The employment hazards for both spell-types exhibit positive duration dependence during the first months and negative duration dependence thereafter.

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Extended benefits and the duration of UI spells: evidence from the New Jersey extended benefit program

Cited by 282 publications

References 18 publications

Active social insurance

Active social insurance

How do different entitlements to unemployment benefits affect the transitions from unemployment into employment?

Temporary layoffs and the duration of unemployment

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