Active social insurance

Abstract

The paper argues that a comprehensive activation strategy is called for -in both unemployment and disability insurance -to minimize the conflict between income insurance and work incentives and to prevent the economic crisis from causing a long-lasting decline in labor force participation. A review of recent empirical evidence, particularly from the Scandinavian countries, indicates that "mild" activation requirements effectively counteract moral hazard problems in social insurance. The paper also argues that the distinction between unemployment and disability is blurred, and that both temporary and permanent disability insurance programs should be designed to encourage and support the use of remaining (partial) work capacity.

Can welfare conditionality combat high school dropout?

“…It also relates to a fast-growing literature on the impacts of activation, monitoring, and sanctions in social insurance as well as welfare programs; see, e.g., Blank (2002), Moffitt (2007), and Røed (2012) for recent reviews. A consensus view coming out of this literature is that activation, as well as monitoring and sanctions, do tend to lower the public costs of providing transfer programs, both by reducing the number of claims and by reducing their average duration.…”

Leaving Poverty Behind? The Effects of Generous Income Support Paired with Activation

“…A potential solution to this dilemma is to couple generosity with activation, effectively removing the leisure-component from a life on income support, and also ensuring some "maintenance" of basic employment-skills. Properly designed, activation requirements facilitate more ambitious social programs without aggravating moral hazard problems; see, for example, Moffitt (2007) for a review of empirical evidence in relation to the introduction of activation requirements in the cash-based welfare program for single mothers in the US, and Røed (2012) for a recent survey of the literature regarding activation strategies in unemployment and disability insurance programs.…”

Hvordan påvirker økt bruk av vilkår for sosialhjelp sysselsetting og lønnsfordeling?

“…Det finnes en stor internasjonal litteratur som viser at ulike former for veiledning og krav til ytelsesmottakere reduserer både antall mottakere og varigheten av ytelsesmottak, i tillegg til ofte å gi økt jobbsannsynlighet (Blank 2002;Moffitt 2007;Røed 2012). I norsk sammenheng har Markussen og Røed (2016) funnet at Kvalifiseringsprogrammet økte deltakernes jobbsannsynlighet, men at virkningen på samlet inntekt var liten.…”