Expressivism and Moore's Paradox

Toppinen, Teemu

doi:10.26556/jesp.v8i1.160

Cited by 4 publications

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“…Woods (2014) originally operates with the idea that, on an expressivist view, "Murder is wrong" would express something like being against murder -a state that has the action-type of murdering as its object. I do the same in my earlier response to Woods (Toppinen 2014). However, the contextualist view and the ecumenical view do not say that "Murder is wrong" expresses a state of being against murder.…”

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confidence: 67%

“…In an earlier paper, I suggested that this argument can be resisted (Toppinen 2014). It is a familiar thought that a sentence such as "Murder is wrong" may, depending on the context of utterance, express, for example, a genuine moral judgment condemning murder, or a merely descriptive judgment to the effect that murder fails to meet some salient, descriptively specifiable standards (e.g., the standards that have currency in the speaker's society).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Relational Expressivism and Moore's Paradox

Toppinen

2017

JESP

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confidence: 67%

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confidence: 99%

Relational Expressivism and Moore's Paradox

Toppinen

2017

JESP

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“…Para un uso diferente de la paradoja de Moore contra el expresivismo cf. Woods (2014); Toppinen (2014). Para otras críticas y posibles respuestas a las mismas: véase Arena (2023, 99ss.…”

Section: Conclusiones: Discrepando Con José Juan Moresounclassified

Discrepando con Moreso. Los desacuerdos morales entre metaética, ética y derecho

Poggi

2023

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Este ensayo pretende reconstruir y examinar algunas de las tesis expuestas por José Juan Moreso en el libro Lo normativo: variedades y variaciones: las relacionadas con el tema de los desacuerdos morales. En primer lugar, resumiré brevemente el debate sobre los desacuerdos morales, introduciendo algunas distinciones. A continuación, analizaré las tesis de Moreso sobre los desacuerdos morales: en particular, me parece que la estrategia argumentativa seguida por Moreso consiste en intentar demostrar que todas las posiciones metaéticas aceptables tienen dificultades para dar cuenta de la existencia de desacuerdos morales genuinos y sin culpa. Contra este argumento, intentaré mostrar cómo algunas posturas, tanto cognitivistas como no-cognitivistas, pueden, en cambio, dar cuenta de ellos. En las conclusiones también formularé un argumento (hay que reconocer, no decisivo) para demostrar que la tesis de la inexistencia de desacuerdos morales genuinos, sin culpa y radicales es self-defeating.

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“…For further discussion, see Beddor 2019a. 33 For other responses to Woods' challenge, see Toppinen 2014;Raskoff 2018;Franzén 2019. 34 For references, see fn.…”

Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 99%