Relational Expressivism and Moore's Paradox

Toppinen, Teemu

doi:10.26556/jesp.v9i2.173

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Study1

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2023

Publication Types

Select...

Article1

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent1

Authors

Journals

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Finally, in Study 3 we aimed to control for the possibility that speakers might be interpreting 'wrong' exocentrically. This is in line with a response made to Woods (2014) by Toppinen (2015). Exocentric readings of evaluative predicates are such that they denote an opinion other than the speaker's, for example, the general opinion of society.…”

Section: Studysupporting

confidence: 83%

Moral and Moorean Incoherencies

Soria-Ruiz,

Franzén

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It has been argued that moral assertions involve the possession, on the part of the speaker, of appropriate non-cognitive attitudes. Thus, uttering ‘murder is wrong’ invites an inference that the speaker disapproves of murder. In this paper, we present the result of 4 empirical studies concerning this phenomenon. We assess the acceptability of constructions in which that inference is explicitly canceled, such as ‘murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it’; and we compare them to similar constructions involving ‘think’ instead of ‘disapprove’—that is, Moore paradoxes (‘murder is wrong but I don’t think that it is wrong’). Our results indicate that the former type of constructions are largely infelicitous, although not as infelicitous as their Moorean counterparts.

show abstract

Section: Studysupporting

confidence: 83%