Exploring the role of repetition and sensory elaboration in the imagination inflation effect

Abstract

Two experiments were conducted to examine whether a misattribution of specific characteristicsor a misattribution of global familiarity underlies false memories as assessed through imagination inflation. Using the paradigm developed by Goff and Roediger (1998), we found that the proportion of false memories increasedwith repeated imagination, replicating the imagination inflation effect. False memories developed through imagination were greatest in conditions that forced participants to include sensory detail in their imaginings. Finally, conscious recollection more often accompanied false memories in perceptually detailed imagination conditions, whereas feelings of familiarity more often accompanied false memories in conditions that lacked sensory cues. These results suggest that imagination that contains more perceptual information leads to more elaborate memory representations containing specific characteristics that can be confused with actually performed actions. Confusion based on these representations, as opposed to confusion based on processing fluency, is more likely to lead to false memories.

Do you remember proposing marriage to the Pepsi machine? False recollections from a campus walk

“…Our results showed more imagined [F(1,38) 82.29, MS e 6.38] and performed [F(1,38) 13.20, MS e 0.27] judgments in the not used-imagined condition than in the not used-not used condition. The level of false performance judgments of .10 to .12 for both familiar and bizarre actions after a single imagining, with moderately high confidence ratings, is similar in magnitude to that typically observed in laboratory studies of imagination inflation (e.g., Goff & Roediger, 1998;Thomas et al, 2003;. 1 Finally, the results of the location-action matching task demonstrated strong memory for locations and their associated actions from Session 1, with an average of .88 correct matches over all participants.…”

“…The participants who had previously performed or imagined actions in Session 1 now imagined themselves performing each action, whereas the participants who had previously observed or imagined the experimenter performing actions now imagined the experimenter performing all actions. Following Thomas et al (2003), the experimenter asked two perceptual questions after each action statement was read (e.g., when asked to imagine knocking on a campus door, the participant was also asked "What sound does your knocking make?" and "What do your knuckles feel like as you knock?")…”

“…These researchers found that increasing the number of imaginings of a new action in the second session increasingly led participants to misremember that action as having been performed in the first session, thereby demonstrating false recollection by imagination inflation (see also Sharman, Garry, & Beuke, 2004). Subsequently, and Thomas, Bulevich, and Loftus (2003) extended these false performance results with a similar procedure and showed that not only would participants misremember imagined common actions (e.g., flipping a coin), they would also falsely remember imagined bizarre actions (e.g., kissing a magnifying glass). Thomas et al further demonstrated that false memories for performing familiar or bizarre actions could be enhanced when participants added perceptual and sensory details to their imagined actions.…”

A little elaboration goes a long way: The role of generation in eyewitness suggestibility

“…events (see Thomas, Bulevich, &Loftus, 2003, for more direct evidence for the role of sensory/perceptual elaboration in the development of false memories). As with imagination, one consequence of pressing witnesses to describe a poorly remembered or fictitious item is that it forces the witness to create a more specific, concrete, and perceptually detailed version of the suggested item.…”

Collaborative encoding and memory accuracy: Examining the effects of interactive components of co-construction processes.

“…This aspect of our findings is of special interest, because previous research might lead one to expect the opposite pattern. When perceptual details are added to predetermined descriptions, asking participants to generate images based on those descriptions can exaggerate the negative effects of repeated imaginations (e.g., Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003). This previous work might lead one to expect that object details would be positively correlated with false recognition errors.…”