Exploring Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Profit Sharing Contract

Abstract

Purpose: The aim of this study is to review relevant articles on the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in profit-sharing contracts in Islamic Banks. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems are problems that occur in profit-sharing contracts, so they impact the low porti on of this contract financing compared to margin-based and fee-based contracts. Theoretical framework: The profit sharing contract in an Islamic bank has two potential problems, namely adverse selection and moral hazard that arise due to asymmetric information. Asymmetric information can occur due to limited information owned by Islamic banks as owners of funds (shahibul maal) regarding the business to be run by customers (mudharib). This asymmetric information mainly causes the agency problem. If an agent is negligent in making decisions with negative consequences and does not want to take responsibility for his actions, this can be classified as a moral hazard. Moral hazard can be in the form of self-interest, side effects, fraud, opportunism, and the behaviour of agents who commit willful mistakes, negligence and breach of contract. Meanwhile, adverse selection arises when the principal cannot observe the agent's characteristics because of asymmetric information before the contract is signed. Design/methodology/approach: The study uses a qualitative approach by reviewing previous articles relevant to the discussion. The study is aligned with the practices that occur in profit-sharing contracts. Furthermore, discussions are deepened through forum group discussions with experts and practitioners in Islamic banks. Findings: The results show that the conflicts in profit-sharing contracts include principal-agent conflicts and principal-principal conflicts due to adverse selection and moral hazards. The study results reveal that signalling and screening measures can be applied to overcome adverse selection problems while monitoring actions and switching to debt contracts can overcome moral hazard problems. Research, Practical & Social implication: The study has implications for Islamic banks to draw up a clear and complete profit-sharing contract with the mudharib to reduce the moral hazard committed by the mudharib. In this case, Islamic banks can also ask the mudharib to submit comprehensive financial reports regarding their financial performance. Islamic banks must also pay attention to signalling and screening efforts to prevent adverse selection. Originality/value: The value of the study provides a new literacy regarding the potential for agency conflict in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection that will be faced by Islamic banks when applying profit-sharing contracts with other parties as managers (mudharib).

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“…With the various "excellent" characteristics in managing the customer, a high level of confidence is obtained that the customer can be trusted in managing the funds entrusted to him. Mudharib, who is essentially a representative of the shahibul maal, can carry out his role as a representative acting on the basis of the best interests of the shahibul maal (Salman, 2023). Based on an in-depth understanding of guarantees, a metaphor of trust can be further realized through the issuance of guarantees given by parties other than the party holding the trust in a profit-sharing-based contract.…”

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