Exploring Cybercrime Disruption through Laboratory Experiments

Sebagh, Lonie; Lusthaus, Jonathan; Gallo, Edoardo; Varese, Federico; Sirur, Sean

doi:10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00023

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 21 publications

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“…In cybercrime markets, for instance, it is common for delivered services to be defective. For instance, stolen credit card numbers may not work because the seller has intentionally fabricated them or because of external factors such as the intervention of a law enforcement agency (e.g., Sebagh et al (2021)). The reputational uncertainty element in our setting is meant to capture an environment with imperfect monitoring and uncertainty described in the example above.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic networks

Gallo¹,

Riyanto²,

Roy³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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This paper examines experimentally how reputational uncertainty and the rate of change of the social environment determine cooperation. Reputational uncertainty significantly decreases cooperation, while a fast-changing social environment only causes a second-order qualitative increase in cooperation. At the individual level, reputational uncertainty induces more leniency and forgiveness in imposing network punishment through the link proposal and removal processes, inhibiting the formation of cooperative clusters. However, this effect is significant only in the fast-changing environment and not in the slow-changing environment. A substitution pattern between network punishment and action punishment (retaliatory defection) explains this discrepancy across the two social environments.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic networks

Gallo¹,

Riyanto²,

Roy³

et al. 2022

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks

Gallo

Riyanto

Roy

et al. 2022

Games and Economic Behavior

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Cooperation in an Uncertain and Dynamic World

et al. 2019

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We investigate how reputational uncertainty and the rate of change of the social environment interact to influence cooperation in social networks. Reputational uncertainty significantly decreases cooperation and welfare, induces more forgiveness toward defectors, and promotes opportunistic play. Compared to reputational uncertainty, a fast-changing social environment only causes a secondorder qualitative increase in cooperation by making individuals more lenient in imposing a network-punishment (link removal). The interaction between reputational uncertainty and a fast-changing social environment induces more lenient strategies by reducing the frequency of action-punishment (retaliatory defection). Although neither of them affects the aggregate network metrics, their interaction decreases homophily among cooperators.

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Exploring Cybercrime Disruption through Laboratory Experiments

Cited by 3 publications

References 21 publications

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic networks

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic networks

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks

Cooperation in an Uncertain and Dynamic World

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