Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification

Abstract

Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their ‘explanatory profiles’. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.

From Shorter to Longer Timescales: Converging Integrated Information Theory (IIT) with the Temporo-Spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC)

“…This would complement IIT with its focus on the first type of temporal integration featured by short timescales (100–300 ms). More generally, TTC provides a larger and temporally more comprehensive framework for IIT (and other neuroscientific theories; [ 25 , 103 ])—the latter concerns short-term temporal aspects of consciousness that can be complemented by the longer-term temporal features and mechanisms of the temporo-spatial framework provided by TTC. This makes it possible to also consider yet another key feature of TTC, namely, the assumption that temporo-spatial features are shared by neuronal and phenomenal states as their ‘common currency’ [ 23 , 104 , 105 ], which, in part, converges with the assumption of their identity in IIT.…”

A connectome-based model of conscious access in monkey cortex

“…Therefore, our finding of the importance of NMDA receptors and a (potentially subcortical) vigilance signal to ignition is consistent with multiple converging lines of evidence, which are illuminating the network, cellular and synaptic mechanisms of conscious processing. In the future, the development of large-scale network simulations with spiking neurons (Brette et al 2007; Joglekar et al 2018), linking from ion channels to dendritic, laminar, areal and brain-wide dynamics (Goldman et al 2019) across species (Sanz Leon et al 2013) should help link across the scales of neuroscience and provide a platform to test various theories of consciousness (Doerig et al 2021; Seth and Bayne 2022; Signorelli et al 2021).…”

“…;Joglekar et al 2018), linking from ion channels to dendritic, laminar, areal and brain-wide dynamics(Goldman et al 2019) across species (SanzLeon et al 2013) should help link across the scales of neuroscience and provide a platform to test various theories of consciousness(Doerig et al 2021;Seth and Bayne 2022;Signorelli et al 2021). …”

Brain-heart interactions in the neurobiology of consciousness

“…Many theories have been established to hypothesize the origin of consciousness. The theoretical landscape is broad, with a lack of convergence between theories [96,97]. Theories of consciousness range from the sole existence of inner mental states, to the access to higher-order cognition (detailed discussions can be found elsewhere, e.g., Block, 2005 Thompson and Varela, 2001).…”